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abstract
For some time, Oakland, California has suffered the cruel misfortune of persistently negative
challenges, including high unemployment, poverty, and slow economic growth. Oakland leaders
believe that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 can help relieve the city
of these ailments. Thus far, the City has received over $200 million in Stimulus awards from
the government. Over one third of the grant total is designated for workforce and economic
development as well as the promotion of energy efficiency. This thesis explores the role of
federal investment in local economic development in Oakland. The research first evaluates the
effects of two prior periods of government funding in the City - the injection of federal funds to
finance the war industries during World War Il and the Economic Development Administration's
City Rebuilding Program during the 1960s - and then contrasts how the current flow of stimulus
dollars represents a third installment of federal investment that offers a new opportunity for
sustained, equitable, and green economic development. Through comparative analysis with
similar efforts in Seattle, Washington and Portland, Oregon I argue that in its current form,
Oakland's Weatherization and Energy Retrofit Loan Program relies upon a weak finance structure,
provides no guarantees for disadvantaged workers, and fails to consider how the age of the
city's building stock, income distribution, and racial spread influence where the City should
focus retrofit services. By amending these aspects of its retrofit program Oakland can realize its
own goals of improved economic, environmental and social equity, and fulfill the promise of the
Recovery Act. Therefore, Oakland could serve as a model displaying how cities with nascent
energy retrofit programs can improve them to achieve a triple-bottom line of economic, social,
and environmental benefits.
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preface
On January 29,2010, I attended a meeting in Oakland convened by PolicyLink to discuss whether
local community organizations, non-profits, and the Alameda County Building Trades should
partner with the City and join the Emerald Cities Collaborative (ECC). A second purpose of the
meeting was to consider if the group did form Emerald Cities Oakland, could it develop an energy
efficiency retrofit strategy for the City. ECC is a national alliance of business, labor, community,
environment, social justice, technical assistance and research organizations dedicated to
greening the nation's cities. As core principles, the collaborative promotes equal opportunity,
community wealth, and democratic engagement as social drivers for responsible environmental
development in cities. ECC's first project echoes an initiative put forth by President Obama as
he signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act into law a year ago: the comprehensive
energy retrofit of the United States' urban building stock. The Emerald Cities Collaborative
also intends to use this first project as a means to integrate career pathways in training and job
placement and secure community-labor agreements for all retrofit work.
At the same time, the City of Oakland was preparing to launch a new home energy retrofit
program funded through the Recovery Act. That both of these processes were developing
separately highlights a critical paradox of the Stimulus Package and the difficulty of planning
around it. One Oakland staffer described the Stimulus as both a facilitator and an obstacle. It
presents cities with opportunities to do things that would not have been possible in the absence
of the money, but given the transparency and spending requirements, there is huge pressure
to activate the funds within a short time frame (Chin). In light of this reality, it becomes easier
to comprehend that city staffs are overwhelmed, organizations are pursuing innovative ideas
to promote their causes in the midst of the post-Stimulus frenzy, and members of both groups
require more support to ensure success. This is the climate in which cities, organizations, and
the federal government are working aggressively to simultaneously tackle three of the largest
challenges facing this nation: the impacts of stagnant economic development, joblessness, and
environmental degradation. I began wondering how the city's retrofit program could better align
with the ideas put forth at the ECC meeting, what that partnership might look like, and whether
a cohesive retrofit strategy could be established and still capitalize off of the present Stimulus
moment. This thesis explores how Oakland, California can maximize the promise of the Recovery
Act and the opportunities it presents.
introduction
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
On February 17,2009, President Barack Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA) into law, injecting $787 billion into the U.S. economy to stem the financial crisis
facing the nation. In developing the Act, Congress hoped to achieve three goals: (1) create new
and secure existing jobs; (2) generate immediate economic activity and support sustainable
economic growth; and (3) standardize government accountability and transparency of spending
(The United States Federal Government, "The Act," 2009). We commonly refer to this legislation
as the Stimulus or Recovery Act.
In terms of energy efficiency retrofitting, the federal government set aside $5 billion for the
Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP), $3.2 billion for the Energy Efficiency and Conservation
Block Grant Program, $3.1 billion for the State Energy Program, and $2 billion for the Neighborhood
Stabilization Program. The Obama Administration claimed that the influx of money designated
for energy efficiency and weatherization could cover weatherization retrofits for 75% of all federal
buildings and one million private homes throughout the nation. These weatherization goals
represent an important step in jumpstarting the green economy through retrofit job creation and
market expansion.
Federal Investment in Oakland, California
As stated earlier, legislators drafted the Recovery Act to create and preserve jobs, stimulate
economic activity and support extended economic growth, and demand a level of government
accountability theretofore never witnessed. In his Denver address marking the passage of the bill,
President Obama announced another goal of the Stimulus Package - "laying the groundwork for a
new, green energy economy that can create countless well-paying jobs." Additionally, he added,
the Recovery Act would increase the economic stability of low-income families and lower their
energy bills by weatherizing one million American homes through the Weatherization Assistance
Program (Obama 2009). While the goals of the Stimulus and the President's comments assume
a national tone, they apply to Oakland in very localized ways.
As of January 2010, Oakland's unemployment rate stood at 17.7% compared to the national
unemployment rate of 9.7% for the same month (Oakland Community and Economic Development
Agency; United States Department of Labor). Within Alameda County, Oakland's unemployment
rate tops all other cities. The high unemployment rate in the city is likely exacerbated by the
stagnant growth of the national economy, but for years Oakland has experienced other problems
such as disinvestment and poverty. These deep-rooted realities hinder economic development
that could benefit all Oakland residents, especially its least advantaged. A 2007 report produced by
the East Bay Alliance for a Sustainable Economy (EBASE) and Oakland NetWork for Responsible
Development (ONWRD) assessed that 42% of city residents live in poverty (earning incomes
of 200% or less that of the Federal poverty level). Almost half of renters and homeowners in
the city spend in excess of 30% of their income on housing costs, contributing to an increased
income disparity within the city. Combined with the high unemployment rate, these problems
reflect the need for meaningful economic development in the City. The Stimulus Package and
its programs are designed to relieve some of the social and economic pressures that cities like
Oakland face.
The second point defending why Oakland serves as the unit of analysis is the fact that twice in
the city's history the federal government played both an indirect and direct role in local economic
development. The Stimulus Package, though relevant to all U.S. states and cities, represents a
critical third wave of federal investment in Oakland. To date, the City has received almost $71
million of federal grant funding from ARRA for economic and workforce development and energy
efficiency. Understanding the impacts of these two prior investment periods and why they failed
to develop a thriving, balanced economy in Oakland is critical to evaluating the opportunity for
change posed by this third wave of federal investment.
Finally, I find Oakland both challenging and enticing as a research topic. Growing up on the
west side of San Francisco, Oakland always seemed so far away. As a youth I rarely visited the
East Bay. Even as I attended UC Berkeley as an undergraduate I always commuted to school
and therefore never properly engaged with Oakland other than passing through it on my BART
(Bay Area Rapid Transit) rides home. The paradox of being only 15 miles from a city that felt
so different is a symptom of the Bay Area's uneven regional development, privileging certain
geographic areas over others. Therefore, this analysis of Oakland provides a way for me to
understand my own home as well as place its urban growth in my deep understanding of the
region. Prior to this endeavor I knew little of Oakland's geography, history, or demographics.
Now I understand how these factors shape city policy and the future of its residents.
Methodology
The research design for this thesis incorporates historical, case study, and comparative analysis
methods to shape the argument. Admittedly, the author's personal connection to the San
Francisco Bay Area region was also a reason for selecting Oakland as the primary focus of the
thesis. Still, the analysis advances the notion that understanding a place's history is critical to
shaping policies and programs that will guide its future. Research began with a literature review
exploring major periods of federal investment in Oakland over the last 70 years. A subsequent
review of energy efficiency retrofit practice, its benefits to homeowners, and economic promise
ultimately identified the other two cases examined in this thesis. Then followed the case studies,
which included an in-depth qualitative analysis examining how Oakland, California, Seattle,
Washington, and Portland, Oregon enacted individual energy retrofit programs relative to five
criteria. Next, the comparative analysis of these cases evaluated the strengths and weaknesses
of the individual programs in order to devise an optimal retrofit strategy for Oakland. The
comparison also helped distill a set of best practices for other cities interested in establishing
retrofit programs of their own. The historical, case study, and comparative analyses form the
base of the argument, but the thesis also utilizes Geographic Information Systems (GIS) mapping.
A GIS survey of Oakland's housing stock, median income and racial distributions helped identify
city areas in greatest need of retrofit services and supplements the argument with a geographical
analysis.
This thesis differs from traditional comparative case studies in that it does not evaluate the
outcomes of these programs. Their outcomes cannot be measured yet as the programs either
are currently in the pilot phase or have not completed a full funding cycle. Instead, the research
investigates how differences in the programs' designs shape whether or not they achieve their
respective goals. This approach was intentional as it produces a clear picture of city-scale home
energy retrofit programs sponsored by the Stimulus at a time when much of the money continues
to roll out to states and municipalities. In this way, cities can learn about innovative ways of
leveraging federal funds to establish retrofit programs capable of providing years of economic,
social and environmental benefits to residents. Additionally, this approach offers a way for the
City of Oakland and its organizational, business, and community partners to react in real time to
improve WERLP.
Moving Forward
Chapter 1 explores Oakland's previous experiences with federally-sponsored economic
development. Chapter 2 articulates the value of energy efficiency and weatherization. It explains
the history, role, and limitations of the Weatherization Assistance Program and presents the idea
of energy efficiency retrofitting as an economic driver. Chapter 3 explores how retrofit efforts
in Seattle, Washington and Portland, Oregon, compare with Oakland's own retrofit program.
Chapter 4 highlights Oakland's need for a greatly expanded city-scale retrofitting strategy and
suggests ways the City can achieve this goal. Finally, Chapter 5 presents how local organizations
and ECC can partner with Oakland to expand and improve retrofit service delivery, job quality,
and environmental gains.
chapter one
the federal government as an economic agent
(case history and context)
World War II: Federal Investment and Oakland's Contribution to the War Effort
Prior to World War II, Oakland existed both as a suburban San Francisco sibling and the growing
urban, financial, business, and industrial center of the eastern Bay Area. The transcontinental
railroad ended in Oakland, making the city a west coast freight destination, and the dry dock
companies that built ships during World War I further contributed to the city's industrial growth.
On the eve of the Second World War, Oakland was primarily a blue-collar city and immigrants of
Italian, Portuguese, Mexican, and Eastern European descent, as well as blacks and other non-
white groups accounted for almost a third of the city's population (U.S. Bureau of the Census
601, 637). With the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. surged into World War 11 and the Pacific
campaign established the need for massive maritime combat resources expanding west coast
shipbuilding activity to unprecedented levels. The federal government allocated incredible sums
of money to private California companies to produce ships for the war. For example, California
received $35 billion between 1940 and 1946, with the state taking in $8 billion from the federal
government in 1945 alone (Bagwell 234).
In order to achieve the high production levels necessitated by the war effort, the East Bay
imported a vast number of workers and their families to ensure that the shipyards of Richmond,
Oakland, and Vallejo operated at full capacity. As Marilynn Johnson explains in The Second Gold
Rush: Oakland and the East Bay in World War II, the migration of workers to California during the
World War 11 spurred the largest population growth in the state since the 1850s (31). Between
1940 and 1945 the population of the San Francisco Bay Area grew by one million people, half
of which settled in the East Bay. Oakland increased by nearly one third from 302,163 residents
to 400,935 over the same time period (Bagwell 237). As a result of the overwhelming amount
of work created in the Bay Area created to sustain the war effort, East Bay industrialists had to
look beyond local and state borders to fill jobs - a situation that demanded new outreach and
management efforts.
Early on in this effort, wartime industrialists like Henry Kaiser, who specialized in large engineering
projects and shipbuilding, partnered with the War Labor Board and the local shipyard unions to
secure an agreement intended to maximize production, manage migration, and stabilize labor
relations between employers and workers. A second partnership between Kaiser and the War
Manpower Commission assumed responsibility for guiding laborers to the union halls where
labor leaders steered them to jobs. The industrial firm managers turned to every known corner
to supply the skilled labor demand. Kaiser enlisted workers from his other two large projects, the
Hoover and Grand Coulee dams. But, as the war in the Pacific intensified and California failed
to supply the workforce necessary to keep the dry docks operating at full tilt, shipbuilders began
looking outside the state for supplemental labor (Johnson 34, 36, 37). The shipyards recruited
laborers from across the nation, but a majority of them emigrated from southern U.S. states
like Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana. For many individuals seeking respite from the
Depression years, wartime work in the East Bay shipyards offered a level of economic stability
that had been absent for some time.
Johnson explains that the government-sponsored war migration, "increased the racial and
cultural diversity of the population, making the East Bay and other urban centers more black
and more southern than ever before" (31). In fact, Oakland's black population increased from
almost 8,500 to 37,000 during the war years. Vehement race and class issues (intensified by
Jim Crow laws) gripped the nation in the mid-twentieth century, and played an important role in
shaping Oakland today. Professionally and socially, blacks were not well received in Oakland.
"Auxiliary" unions were created to segregate blacks, requiring them to pay dues but denying
them union voting power (Bagwell 238-240). A quote from an Oakland weekly, The Observer,
clearly articulates how blacks were perceived in Oakland in 1944:
[There has been an] influx of what might be called socially-liberated or uninhibited
Negroes who are not bound by the old and peaceful understanding between the Negro
and the white in Oakland, which has lasted for so many decades, but who insist upon
barging into the white man and becoming an integral part of the white man's society
(Bagwell 240).
Though the federal government can be attributed with stimulating job growth in the East Bay
during World War II, it also had a hand in Oakland's segregated housing development pattern.
Local governments and defense contractors completed the team that would shape where
Oakland's migrants would live. Policies that favored white homebuyers further limited the
housing options of blacks and ethnic minorities in Oakland. In 1941, Congress authorized the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to oversee the Title 6 program which guaranteed private
housing construction loans. However, most Title 6 programs only allowed white homebuyers to
participate. Hence, the program assumed a critical role in facilitating the white exodus to the
suburbs, whose development exploded after the war.
The federal government began offering public housing options in 19421 and the East Bay
housing authorities created a residential zone along the bay flatlands to construct housing
units for the huge numbers of migrants flocking to the area (Johnson 92). The flatland areas
that run along the eastern edge of San Francisco Bay were at the time sparsely populated
and undesirable because they faced drainage problems. For these reasons, Oakland's flatland
districts offered the government large blocks of cheap land to set up public housing (Johnson
98). The government built these projects as temporary housing for migrant war workers and
therefore failed to consider such factors as social implications, design quality, and safety when
planning the public housing developments of the East Bay. In many cases, the need to quickly
house workers to ensure maximum production at the shipyards resulted in rows of wood frame
two story homes composed of poor materials (109).
In Oakland, these shipyard ghettos sprang up in the flatland neighborhoods of East and West
Oakland. Migrants were segregated into black and white projects, which served two purposes
for the local housing authorities: it enabled them to one, dampen the racial strife between blacks
and whites and two, control the impacts of wartime migration. Most native populations resided
in neighborhoods outside the flatland areas, providing the housing authorities a physical means
of protecting those communities. The crush of migration to the war industries in the East Bay
subjected the housing stock to intense use while the poor-quality construction ensured its
decline. The segregation statutes established by the local housing authorities effectively ushered
black families to the worst housing stock, often in overcrowded and deteriorating neighborhoods
(Johnson 93,107,109).
The facts regarding the federal government's involvement in Oakland's growth and the manner
in which it was settled are important because as the city experienced the postwar vacuum of
disinvestment (both government and private), minority populations suffered disproportionately as
job opportunities languished. The federal government may have intended the wartime housing
programs in the Oakland shipyard ghetto communities to serve a temporary purpose, but history
has revealed that the housing policies enacted during World War 11 exacted persistently negative
effects on blacks and other minority groups. In American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for
Postwar Oakland, author Robert Self reasons that the racist actions of the federal government on
1 The U.S. Maritime Commission and Federal Works Agency built the units, but local housing authorities were
responsible for occupancy and management decisions.
the postwar housing market effectively established American "apartheid". After the war, the FHA
and Veterans Association, the two primary agencies responsible for managing the federal state's
housing policy, continued to produce programs like Title 6 that institutionalized segregation by
securing the suburbs for white settlement (97). Importantly, Self explains that it is inappropriate
and inadequate to describe the construction and colonization of the suburbs as the outcome of
a particular social behavior termed "white flight." Rather, he asserts:
"...that white suburbanization in this period represented the complicated intersection of
public policy and subsidy, economic individualism and self-interest, and regional
development and underdevelopment ..." (100)
Self's description of the "push" factors that compelled white families to leave Oakland in the
postwar era is important. First, they directly contributed to the vacuum of disinvestment (both
public and private) Oakland began experiencing in the years after World War II. The FHA policies
that subsidized suburban home construction essentially robbed cities like Oakland twice:
Federal money that formerly flowed to the city in the forms of job and housing opportunities was
now directed to the development of new towns and cities that excluded minorities from moving
out of their city neighborhoods. Second, local city-builders also targeted new industrial and
commercial properties in proximity to the new suburbs, isolating minorities from many of the
new jobs being generated after the war. This framework of urban underinvestment and minority
isolation set Oakland's flatland neighborhoods on a course of decline that would have effects
into the present day.
1966: The Economic Development Administration's Rebuilding Pmgram
Only twenty years after the end of World War 1l, the U.S. government again tried to influence
economic development in Oakland. As part of his campaign to end poverty and racial injustice
in the United States, President Lyndon Johnson established a set of government programs
known as "the Great Society." One outcome of the plan was the passage of the Public Works
and Economic Development Act of 1965. The Act included a provision creating the Economic
Development Administration (EDA), tasked with generating new jobs, protecting existing jobs, and
promoting commercial growth in economically distressed communities. In April of 1966 the EDA
selected Oakland as the pilot city for its Rebuilding Program. The program represented President
Johnson's urban economic development plan, designed to save the nation's struggling cities from
such intensifying problems as poverty, unemployment and racial strife (Pressman and Wildavsky
1). As discussed in relation to Oakland, similar processes of disinvestment, segregation, and
suburbanization all contributed to the decline of many U.S. cities by the 1960s.
Two points puzzled people regarding Oakland's selection and the implementation of the new
program. The first intriguing element was that the Johnson administration had not placed the new
program under the purview of the newly formed Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Next, people took interest in the fact that larger cities like New York, Los Angeles, or Chicago -
places that had all endured the wrath of racial conflict - were not selected as the pilot test sites.
The Wall Street Journal article that publicized the program offered insight into how Oakland was
chosen, describing the City as a place, "of high unemployment and racial unrest that Federal
agents have dubbed a powder keg" (qtd. in Pressman & Wildavsky, Implementation, p. 1). A
black community leader in Oakland, Curtis Lee Baker reflected the anger bubbling to the surface
in minority city neighborhoods stating:
"We hate Whitey because he hates us, thinks us no better than dogs. Call me 'Nigger,'
it gives me respect. I have no respect for Whites, because they have no respect for me.
I just want to be considered human. I'm not responsible for five hundred years of
history, but for getting justice now. If we don't get it, we'll have a Watts here, and kill
and bomb" (Bradford 4).
Unemployment in the city was more than twice the national average in 1966, and government
officials must have feared a repeat of the Watts Riots that had torn apart the Los Angeles
neighborhood a few months earlier. Baker made his remarks at a meeting in December of 1965
between EDA chief Eugene Foley and Oakland community members, where resident leaders
described the state of the city's black neighborhoods to the department head and some of his
staff. The Oakland community representatives expressed great skepticism as to the nature and
potential of the EDA pilot. Later in that meeting, Mr. Baker inquired, "What did it cost to bring
you rich White men out here? We'd rather have the money. We've had enough studies. What
we need now is justice, action, jobs!" (Bradford 5)
Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky explain in Implementation: How Great Expectations in
Washington Are Dashed in Oakland, that the EDA presented a very straightforward purpose for
Oakland's pilot program: assuage the economic and social unrest in the city by underwriting
public works projects and business loans that would create jobs for primarily black unemployed
residents (1). The program allocated over $23 million2 for public works grants and loans to
fund four large development projects consisting of the construction of a new hangar at the
Oakland International Airport; a new Marine Terminal for the city port; an industrial park also on
port property; and an access road to the recently completed Oakland Coliseum. Foley claimed
that the projects would generate 3,000 jobs for unemployed Oakland workers. In order to
ensure the development of the projects and the promised number of jobs, the EDA established
guidelines requiring all recipients of federal funding to submit an employment plan describing
how they would diligently work to hire Oakland's most disadvantaged and unemployed workers.
2 In 1966 real dollars. Adjusted for inflation, the same investment today would amount to $130.5 million.
The program created an Employment Plan Review Board, comprised of businesspersons,
labor representatives, and the poor, and stipulated that it must approve all plans. The EDA
also mandated that all employers submit monthly hiring reports to the review board. In these
ways, the Economic Development Administration tied federal dollars to employer performance
standards (Pressman and Wildavsky 2,3).
Despite the community mistrust, the program presented an innovative new form of local
economic development by brokering partnerships between business, labor, and minorities. The
EDA oversight was intended to be the glue that held these partnerships together, just as the
Employment Plan Review Board was designed to keep the contracting firms honest as far as
hiring the locally unemployed. Therefore, the success of the program very much depended
on the government's ability to impel diverse participants to work collectively, in spite of their
organizational differences and objectives (Pressman and Wildavsky 30). This proved difficult
from the onset as local firms expressed great interest in government funds and measured
interest in the hiring quotas. They accepted the EDA's terms as a means to access financing,
but the facts reveal that the agency struggled to enforce their stated hiring practices. EDA
grantees often maneuvered around the hiring restrictions. Even as administrators set stricter
requirements for minority hiring, agency officials pointed out that enforcing them was tough. On
the terminal project, the grantees reported that 60% of total workers were minorities. But a sly
caveat clouded this claim - the 60% figure described the workforce on peak days. On off-peak
days minority workers amounted to a much smaller number. Moreover, many EDA contract
companies would hire minorities as temporary labor, prohibiting access to training and skilled
positions (Pressman and Wildavsky 65). Five years after the program's inception, the EDA Office
of Public Works produced a project report of the Oakland pilot. The total number of minority
jobs created in Oakland between 1965 and 1970 summed to 500.3 Collectively, the EDA projects
in Oakland generated less than half of the 3,000 positions Foley guaranteed, and dispelled any
lasting hope that they would be an agent for economic change to improve the lives of the inner-
city unemployed (Pressman and Wildavsky 68).
Impacts of the First Two Waves of Federal Economic Development on Oakland
Between 1945 and 1970, the United States government funded two separate economic
development initiatives in Oakland. The sole purpose behind the first campaign was to serve the
World War Il effort. The employment opportunities created and the subsequent worker migration
3 Total minority hiring numbers are inaccurate to the degree that figures are not available for two of the EDA
projects in Oakland - the American Toy Company which occupied the industrial park and Universal Airlines' terminal
development.
to fill those positions came out of government concern to keep the war machine operating at
full capacity. The closure of the shipyards in the years after the war deprived minorities of the
job security they had depended on. This was especially unsettling considering the lingering
memories of the Great Depression from only a half-decade earlier. Housing policies that favored
white homebuyers and the growth of suburban economic opportunities physically isolated
Oakland minorities and further limited their access to the new jobs of the flourishing postwar
American economy.
Within a decade of World War II, President Johnson launched the "Great Society" programs
including the War on Poverty. The Economic Development Administration was charged with
spearheading a pilot program to put Oakland's inner-city unemployed minorities back to work.
The EDA revealed an innovative approach to securing its employment objectives: all firms
receiving government grants or business loans would not only be required to produce a business
plan subject to agency approval, but also an employment plan explaining how they intended to
recruit, train, and hire unemployed minority workers from Oakland. In his book Oakland's Not for
Burning, the EDA special representative in the city, Amory Bradford, explains that the task force
performed exceptionally well as far as procuring agency funds, selecting and approving projects,
and establishing the employment plan (requiring firms to target minority unemployed workers for
hire). Failure occurred in the implementation process as the EDA struggled to keep beneficiary
firms on schedule and elicit the minority jobs the program promised. By 1970 Oakland stood in
much the same place it had five years earlier. For the city's worst off, it was a place of increasing
physical and economic starvation.
The Opportunity Presented by a Third Wave of Federal Investment
It would be both unfair and untrue to claim that the U.S. government was solely responsible for
the decline of Oakland and similar cities. In an article challenging government complicity in urban
decline, Robert Beauregard asserts that the scholarship connecting the federal government to
the failure of cities is more, "accusation rather than an empirically substantiated argument" (130).
Beauregard may be correct that the U.S. government cannot be held as the only or principal
agent in the deterioration of all American cities after World War II, but the evidence shows that
two waves of federal policies did contribute to Oakland's current state of high-unemployment
and limited economic opportunity. As the prior section indicates, the City's current situation links
to decisions dating back more than half a century.
Municipal funding through the Recovery Act represents a third wave of government investment
capable of reshaping the Oakland along new economic, social, and environmental lines.4
Economic development exists at the heart of the Recovery Act, but President Obama's words
clearly advance the specific notion of the green economy and its workforce development promise,
as well. In 2008, the founder of Green for All and The Ella Baker Center for Human Rights (two
Oakland organizations), Van Jones, authored The Green Collar Economy: How One Solution Can
Fix Our Two Biggest Problems. Jones presented the idea that green jobs could simultaneously
improve the nation's environmental and economic problems.
Over 30 years before Van Jones began promoting this strategy, the federal government presented
a program built on two green economic principles: increased economic equity and environmental
improvement. In 1976, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) launched the Weatherization
Assistance Program to install energy-efficient technologies in low-income homes. Based on the
successful track record of DOE and WAP over the past 30 years, Congress allocated $5 billion
dollars to the program through the Recovery Act.
In agreement with the federal government, organizations, think tanks, and consulting firms also
acknowledge the promise and need for energy efficiency retrofitting programs (which incorporate
air-sealing, lighting, and insulation improvements as well as appliance upgrades) as a key tool for
national economic development and increased energy independence. However, to be impactful
on both fronts these programs must widely exceed the Weatherization Assistance Program.
Later chapters will illuminate that the effectiveness of retrofit programs depends on achieving
city-wide scale as opposed to a piecemeal approach to weatherization retrofits. To the degree
that this proposal can provide jobs for the urban unemployed, many cities that have struggled to
generate programs that pursue the triple-bottom line of economic development, social equality,
and environmental improvement are exploring energy efficiency retrofitting programs as a
potential solution. This past January, Oakland initiated its Weatherization and Energy Retrofit
Loan Program (WERLP), which represents the City's attempt to address these converging issues
using federal monies. Chapter 3 evaluates WERLP's performance in depth.
4 Thus far, Oakland has garnered $205,746,401 of Federal Stimulus money. Another $217.5 million are currently
pending. If Oakland received all of the pending awards, the total amount of Stimulus funding for the City would amount
to almost half a billion dollars for a city of approximately 400,000 residents.
5 McKinsey & Co., Green for All, and the Center for American Progress have each produced papers celebrating the
benefits of and need for energy efficiency retrofitting programs.
Takeaways from Oakland's Prior Experiences with Federal Investment and Their
Implications for the Current Use of Stimulus Funds
Oakland's first two federally-sponsored economic development experiments present some key
takeaways about the difficulty of such endeavors. The war proved to be an economic boon,
a way to lift the nation out of the Depression by putting people to work in wartime industries.
The policies that lured Americans to the East Bay promised transplants good jobs serving an
admirable cause. However, the government exerted minimal effort to help workers transition to
jobs in the postwar economy. Eventually, the economic situation in the Oakland inner-city and
other American urban areas deteriorated to the point where the federal government was again
willing to try its workforce development hand. The Oakland EDA pilot provided a platform for
the government to test a locally-based economic development strategy that failed to produce
its intended results. These two episodes reveal four important lessons regarding the federal
government's role in local job creation.
1) Federal investments are time contingent.
Federal investments are often associated with particular events, campaigns, or policies. The
two Oakland episodes described above both connected to dominant government interests. The
nation's World War II entrance activated a war machine requiring a dedicated labor force. During
the war years, the federal government made every effort to ensure that workers were moved large
distances to the exploding job markets of the country's port cities. However, after World War 11
the government ceased financing many wartime industries leaving many workers jobless. The
EDA pilot signified a response to dwindling economic opportunities in the cores of U.S. cities,
and Oakland served as the government's test case for its new Rebuilding Program. By 1970, the
program had failed and the guarantee of good jobs for disadvantaged Oakland workers proved
inaccurate. These cases exhibit that when a government-supported campaign ends, money
and job opportunities can disappear. In both situations the federal government did not provide
contingency plans for unemployed workers; subsequently, when the money was spent they were
left to fend for themselves.
Time also plays important roles regarding the implementation of Recovery Act programs. Congress
passed the bill to quell the possibility of a national economic meltdown and the two primary tenets
of the Act boast immediate job creation and economic revival as expected net results. Likewise,
legislators claim that the Stimulus will induce private sector spending in a range of commercial
sectors leading to sustained job development even after all government dollars are spent. These
last two points directly address the notion of expectation. ARRA mandates that grantees spend
all government monies by 2012, setting a discrete end date for the program. The current outflow
of taxpayer dollars forces us to question the federal government's post-stimulus contingency
plans for potentially still unemployed workers after the 2012 deadline or for those who may
lose jobs if the funding dries up. Given that neither of the previous Oakland experiences with
federally-funded economic development successfully produced sustained positive outcomes
for minority workers, city employees, planners, business leaders, and community organizations
should brainstorm possible safety nets now to stave off surprises down the road.
2) Government-sponsored programs are highly politicized affairs.
Presidents Roosevelt and Johnson used their respective campaigns to address social problems
plaguing the nation under their tenure. As mentioned above, joining the Allied war effort
resuscitated the American economy and rallied the nation around a patriotic cause. Meanwhile,
President Johnson's Great Society programs intended to address poverty and racial injustice in
the United States. The government programs that mobilized workers during World War 11 and
established the EDA pilot directly served President Roosevelt and Johnson's political agendas.
As political agendas shift, a once popular policy or program can easily be cancelled. Upon the
war's end, President Truman (President Roosevelt died in early 1945) pared back shipbuilding
leading to mass layoffs at the dry docks. Similarly, as the highly publicized EDA pilot struggled
to fulfill its promise, the Johnson Administration deemed it was better to end the program than
suffer additional embarrassment.
President Obama is using ARRA in much the same way that his predecessors capitalized on the
flow of public funds to pursue political goals. This statement does not suggest that Presidents
Roosevelt, Truman and Johnson only acted in pursuit of political gain. Nor does it contend
that President Obama pushed Congress to pass the Stimulus bill out of opportunism. Instead,
the President likely believed that the Recovery Act was necessary to buoy the economy, and
if positive results materialized as a result would play to his political advantage. For some time
political pundits, Congresspersons, and the President considered the possibility of a second
Stimulus, but in recent months increasing skepticism about ARRA has all but dispelled this
idea. This political shift places increased pressure on ARRA's ability to produce sustainable and
long-term jobs and stimulate the economy which recalls similar pressure the EDA experienced
implementing the Rebuilding Program.
3) It can be difficult for a federal campaign to affect local change, even with
extensive oversight.
This lesson directly relates to the EDA pilot program. EDA oversight intended to ensure that the
businesses and labor organizations satisfied their minority hiring and training quotas. Yet, the
EDA had never before managed an urban economic development strategy. The agency failed
to exact the desired results from Oakland employers and labor organizations, particularly given
that the oversight standards only mandated that funding recipients submit regular employment
reports and hiring plans. While tighter restrictions - like withholding a portion of funds unless
employers met certain hiring targets - would have slowed the EDA pilot's progress even more, it
might have improved the program's overall performance.
It appears the federal government learned the above lesson. Thus far, it has released less than
half of the $20 billion dollars awarded to California (The United States Federal Government,
"State / Territory Summaries: California"). The Act stresses that it will display unprecedented
levels of accountability and transparency in government spending, and given the bewildering
amount of money the federal government issued to states and municipalities, taxpayers should
commend the government's commitment to oversight. Still, the government must seek to strike
a balance between controlling the flow of funds and releasing them to promote state and city
economic growth.
4) Government investment can produce positive economic development results
when the funding is directed to "shovel ready" activities with.
An important similarity between the federal government's investment in the wartime industries, the
EDA Rebuilding Cities program, and the Stimulus is that money is being directed through public
channels to private industry. As evidenced during WWII, government investment can produce
positive economic development results when allocated to "shovel ready" activities. Government
contracts to firms that shifted their operations to supply goods and services supporting the
Armed forces put the nation back to work. Shipbuilding represented a "shovel ready" investment
once the U.S. entered World War 11 and the government helped businesses recruit workers from
around the nation.
However, a key difference between expending money to finance a war and promoting economic
development is the concept of demand. The war created a sustained period of demand whereby
the government dedicated monumental amounts of funding to private industry to achieve a single
goal - perseverance over the Axis powers. The EDA experiment and the Stimulus represent
approaches with less defined goals and limited demand for services. Oakland possessed a
demand for economic development strategies that would benefit disadvantaged workers.
Yet, the industries the EDA invested in continued to exclude minority employees. A critical
disconnect existed between those needing jobs and employers willing to hire them. The EDA
failed to properly align disadvantaged workers with growing businesses. The resulting labor
surplus only contributed to Oakland's economic development challenges experienced by its
least secure residents. The Recovery Act faces a similar situation but at an exponentially larger
scale. The federal government is confronted with the task of matching hundreds of billions of
dollars to growing industries that can employ almost 30 million Americans - but is there going to
be sustained demand for these services?6
6 Numerical figure based on the U.S. Census estimate of a current national population of 309 million Americans and
an unemployment rate of 9.7% in March of 2010.
chapter two
retrofitting the american city
Energy Efficiency and Weatherization Benefits
Energy efficiency simply refers to technological building improvements that deliver more services
for the same or reduced energy input. According to the International Energy Agency, maximizing
energy efficiency constitutes a key step for securing a sustainable energy future. Energy efficiency
advancements reduce the need to construct new power plants, cut fuel costs, and reduce the
nation's dependence on foreign oil. Furthermore, energy efficiency offers huge environmental
benefits in the form of fewer greenhouse gas emissions and improved air quality.
In the U.S., buildings account for
roughly 40% of primary energy Share of Energy Consumed by Major
use and 38% of C02 emissions, Sectors of the Economy, 2008
but they account for 72% of U.S.
electricity consumption (EIA). In Transportation Commercial
response to these figures, pundits
often characterize weatherization
and energy efficiency as the "low-
hanging fruit" in terms of return on Residential
investment dollars and reduction
in greenhouse gas emissions.
Investing in energy efficiency Industria
retrofits could reduce building 
_
energy consumption by 20 - 40%.
In addition, these investments would amount to huge savings on energy bills and could pay for
themselves over time (Green for All, Green for All and Center on Wisconsin Strategy: A Short
Guide to Setting Up a City-Scale Retrofit Program 2). For example, the average American
household could save between $300 and $1,200 each year (Hendricks et al. 1,2). This is especially
important for low-income families who spend four times as much of their income on energy than
the average American household (Millhone).
. .......................
Additionally, energy efficiency retrofits could spur the creation of a whole new green job
sector. The Center for American Progress has proposed an ambitious plan to retrofit 50 million
residential and commercial buildings - or 40 percent of the nation's building stock - by 2020.
The organization believes that such a campaign could generate as many as 625,000 jobs over
the next ten years. These retrofits would also help employ the 2.4 million currently unemployed
construction workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics). A national retrofit plan on the scale of the
Center for American Progress' "Rebuilding America" model would also open the door for a
huge number of individuals lacking college degrees to access high quality job ladders in energy
efficiency materials and parts manufacturing, retrofit training, building energy auditing, and
retrofit construction work. Stimulating the expected economic and employment gains would
require an estimated $500 billion decade-long investment. Therefore, an average investment of
$50 billion a year is necessary to realize the goal, accounting for almost 30 billion extra dollars
each year over the current $21 billion retrofit market (SBI Energy). The private sector must act as
the primary financier in order for the U.S. retrofit market to reach its full potential. Even though
the Federal government has supported residential retrofits of low-income homes for over thirty
years, the Weatherization Assistance Program requires more extensive support if the nation is to
pursue a national plan for energy efficiency retrofits. The WAP represents an important platform
on which to build a national retrofit strategy, but as the following section will show, the program
alone cannot provide the necessary funding or service capacity to achieve the level of scale
prescribed by energy efficiency advocates.
The Weatherization Assistance Program
The purpose of the Weatherization Assistance Program is to install energy efficient technologies
in low-income family residences.7 Weatherization represents the first level of home retrofitting
and focuses on sealing the building envelope, improving the efficiency of heating, cooling and
electrical systems, and installing energy efficient appliances. The Energy Conservation and
Production Act that created the program stresses, "The weatherization assistance program is to
increase the energy efficiency of dwellings owned or occupied by low-income persons, reduce
their total residential expenditures, and improve their health and safety, especially low-income
persons who are particularly vulnerable such as the elderly, persons with disabilities, families
with children, high residential energy users, and households with high energy burden"(The United
States National Archives and Records Administration). The United States Department of Energy
initiated the Weatherization Assistance Program in 1976 under title IV of the Energy Conservation
and Production Act, the purpose of which was to curb heating bills and conserve imported
7 The Dept. of Energy produces annual guidelines based on the federal poverty level to help states set the qualifying
income threshold for the WAR Even so, the states set the rules that determine who qualifies.
oil. The legislation was a specific reaction on the part of the U.S. government to stem some of
the unforeseen but tragic consequences of the 1973 oil shock. While most Americans faced
tighter budgets due to the increase in oil prices, the spike in energy costs disproportionately
affected low-income households where rising heating bills dragged some families into debt and
in extreme cases even poverty. Senior citizens faced similarly fearful situations, especially those
on strict budgets or social security. Legislators - particularly those from cold winter climates
- legitimately feared that some of their constituents might actually freeze in their own homes.
Concerns about whether the price of oil would remain persistently high and the effects this
could have on the least advantaged Americans, prompted public officials to pass the Energy
Conservation and Production Act and establish the Weatherization Assistance Program.
Early in its existence, the Weatherization Assistance Program primarily focused on emergency
and provisional upgrades (United States Department of Energy, "DOE Weatherization Assistance
Program: History of the Weatherization Assistance Program"). These included caulking and
weather-stripping doors and windows to prevent leakage and other economical modifications
(Kaiser and Pulsipher). As time progressed and program administrators learned the value of
newer energy efficient upgrades, they began incorporating more cost-effective measures such
as storm windows, attic insulation, and enhanced space and water heating systems. The push
to maximize the cost-effectiveness of weatherization home retrofits promoted the practice and
adoption of home energy audits. Energy audits refer to analyzing individual homes to determine
where energy is being wasted and identifying the optimal weatherization improvements to abate
energy problems. Energy audits now represent the benchmark of weatherization practice. To
expand access to the Weatherization Assistance Program to benefit low-income families in warmer
climates, the Department of Energy (DOE; the federal agency responsible for administering the
WAP) expanded the program to include measures that would reduce cooling costs, which often
exceed heating costs in such places. The program's adaptability and improved building analysis
tools have enabled the Weatherization Assistance Program to continually expand its reach (even
in times of budget cutbacks) and improve its own efficiency to relieve the energy needs of low-
income Americans who own or rent single-family, multi-family, or mobile residences (United States
Department of Energy, "DOE Weatherization Assistance Program: History of the Weatherization
Assistance Program").
The success with which the WAP delivers services to low-income households depends on
three levels of actors comprised of (1) the Department of Energy; (2) the states, the District of
Columbia, and Native American Tribal Governments; and (3) a cadre of local governmental or
non-profit agencies. These actors work in concert, performing specific actions that ultimately
deliver weatherization services to low-income families. The DOE provides program funds to
the states, suggests guidelines for eligibility, determines the associated value of particular
energy efficiency upgrades, chronicles energy savings, and offers technical support and training
assistance to weatherization service providers. In turn, the states set the program qualifying
standards, contract with local agencies or organizations that provide weatherization services,
and monitor their work for quality assurance (United States Department of Energy, "DOE
Weatherization Assistance Program: DOE and States' Roles in the Weatherization Assistance
Program"). The service delivery work is either performed by Community Action Partnership
(CAP) agencies or other organizations the agencies contract to provide weatherization services
(Kaiser and Pulsipher). CAP agencies, created by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 to
combat U.S. poverty, are both private non-profit and local government organizations. In addition
to local management of the Weatherization Assistance Program, CAP agencies deliver a host of
other services, such as education job training, economic development, and healthcare, among
others (Community Action Partnership: The National Association).
While the structure governing the delivery of the WAP services has remained static over time, the
guidelines dictating the amount of funding allocated to each state have been revised. The Federal
Energy Administration (FEA), the predecessor to the DOE established the original allotment
formula in 1977. In developing the formula, FEA addressed four factors deemed most relevant
to achieving an equitable distribution of weatherization funds: 1) the number of dwelling units to
be weatherized, 2) the weather patterns in each state, 3) the various types of weatherization work
to be completed, and 4) the cost of heating and cooling as well as other factors set by the DOE
(Federal Register 1977 a, b, 1978). In 1995, the DOE amended the allocation formula to ensure
greater equity for warmer-climate states, but still apportioned fair funding quantities to cold-
climate states to deliver weatherization services to low-income residents. The DOE continues to
use the 1995 revised WAP funding allocation formula.
Currently, four primary sources fund the Weatherization Assistance Program: the U.S. Department
of Energy, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Low-income Home Energy
Assistance Program (LIHEAP), Petroleum Violation Escrow funds, and "Other" sources such as
states, utility companies, and private property owners. The DOE has consistently served as the
primary financing source for the Weatherization Assistance Program - allocating an excess of
$6 billion since 1978. In recent years though, LIHEAP has surpassed the DOE as the primary
financier of the program. In 2008, total LIHEAP weatherization funding also eclipsed the $6
billion mark (LIHEAP Clearinghouse).
Understanding the purpose, history, structure, funding sources, and allocation formula of the
Weatherization Assistance Program are critical to examining the expansion of the program under
the Recovery Act. Congress dealt $4.7 billion of Stimulus funds to the program because the
DOE deemed weatherization to be a "shovel ready" activity (Wald and Kaufman). The Legislature
qualified "shovel ready" based on five WAP factors:
1) The program possessed an existing infrastructure of processes and procedures that
had been in place for decades;
2) Weatherization science and techniques are well understood, relatively uncomplicated,
and transferable;
3) Performance metrics assess total units weatherized per total investment dollars;
4) The program guarantees immediate benefits to low-income residents; and
5) Weatherization measures produce appreciable environmental gains (U.S. Department
of Energy Office of Inspector General Office of Audit Services 4-5).
Regardless of the perceived ease of administering the WAP through the Stimulus Act, such a
massive funding injection also brings huge pressure against the DOE, the states, and local actors
to rapidly expand capacity and provide services. To fully comprehend the magnitude of the
changes to WAP as a result of the ARRA and its role in broadening the larger energy efficiency
market requires a few points of clarification. The DOE distributed $6 billion to the Weatherization
Assistance Program over its first 33 years. The department intends to disburse nearly $5 billion
between 2009 and 2012 (United States Department of Energy, "DOE Weatherization Assistance
Program: 2009 Recovery Act - Frequently Asked Questions about Weatherization"). With the
increased funding, the DOE estimates the program will grow from approximately 140,000 to an
average of 240,000 weatherization retrofits per year through 2012 (United States Department
of Energy, Weatherization Assistance Program - The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009). To further clarify, WAP only addresses residential units. Considering that many units
retrofitted through the program are in multi-unit buildings, the program can only weatherize a
fraction of the total number of structures the Center for American Progress asserts is necessary
to maximize the economic and environmental benefits of energy efficiency retrofits. In order
to realize its potential through the Recovery Act, WAP must operate at full capacity; thus far,
problems at the federal, state, and municipal levels have severely impeded program success.
In February of 2010, the DOE Inspector General released a special report titled, "Progress in
Implementing the Department of Energy's Weatherization Assistance Program Under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act." The analysis found that despite the DOE's efforts
to smoothly implement the widely expanded WAP, local administrators made minimal progress
actually weatherizing residences. In fact, state grantees drew less than 8% of the nearly $5
billion awarded to the program. Accordingly, the slow activation of Weatherization Assistance
Program grants translated into a miniscule number of retrofits. The ten highest funded recipients
weatherized just 3% of the planned combined units for those states. A quote from the report
reflects the Inspector General's concern for the state of the program: "Because the consequences
of the lack of progress by grantees in the implementation of the Weatherization Program were so
significant, we found this alarming" (2). In sum, the program is failing to produce the economic
returns of the enormous public investment in the WAP and low-income households continue to
suffer from higher utility costs the Recovery Act promised to relieve.
To improve the WAP's performance, the DOE engaged 32 states to identify problems inhibiting
implementation. The Inspector General examination organizes those findings and explains
that regulatory requirements, various state-level issues and training mishaps contributed to the
program's poor results. Even as the DOE aggressively works to ameliorate program impediments,
the Office of the Inspector General recognizes that the Department will experience increased
pressure to weatherize as many units as possible over the remaining two years grantees can
access funds through the ARRA. This fact calls attention to the possibility of, "wasteful, inefficient,
and.. .even abusive practices" on the part of the DOE, states, and sub-grantees as they struggle
to meet weatherization targets (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Inspector General Office of
Audit Services 3-5).
As evidenced above, the Weatherization Assistance Program represents a component for
states, regions, and cities to incorporate into energy efficiency retrofit strategies, but it cannot
be relied upon to drive the entire retrofit market or meet the total service demand. Broad-
based retrofit strategies must reach a larger population outside of income-eligible programs
like the Weatherization Assistance Program. This will require new marketing tactics, but a more
comprehensive system for retrofitting both residential and commercial properties should also be
developed. Additional obstacles such as overcoming financial barriers, establishing good labor
and workforce development standards, and monitoring and evaluating retrofit work must also be
considered when designing an effective city-scale retrofit program.
Components of a City-wide Retrofit Program
In order to take full advantage of the economic, environmental and social benefits of energy-
efficiency, municipalities must make concerted efforts to grow the retrofit market. The DOE's
commitment to provide and increase utility cost relief to low-income American households
deserves praise, but the evidence presented here reveals that the program alone cannot unlock
energy efficiency in the national economy. Federal Stimulus dollars designed to seed the green
economy must also leverage far more private sector investment to simultaneously impact carbon
emissions and joblessness. Furthermore, energy efficiency proponents assert that the city-scale
retrofit program is the silver bullet capable of minimizing utility bills, generating green job growth,
restoring the environment, expanding business opportunities, and extend the reach of ARRA
funding (Green for All, Clean Energy Works Portland ii).
Such programs consist of five primary components:
1) a mechanism to recycle the monetary savings produced by energy efficiency
upgrades in order to fund additional retrofits;
2) the development of high-road jobs that are accessible to all; and
3) a degree of scale beyond the incremental level (Green for All, Green for All and
Center on Wisconsin Strategy: A Short Guide to Setting Up a City-Scale Retrofit
Program 3).
A number of social, environmental and economic justice organizations, as well as organized
labor affiliates also stress the importance of a fourth component:
4) programs that focus on low-income service delivery and job development.8
The following chapter draws attention to a fifth and final criterion of city-scale retrofit programs:
5) partnerships between local governments, community, business and labor
institutions.
These components broadly address those factors that municipalities or regional planning
associations need to consider when designing a retrofit program to achieve economies of scale.
Broad-based energy efficiency programs are complex and their success hinges on the ability of
a managing party to plan and facilitate various activities. The importance of a managing body
cannot be understated - coordinating program activities involving many partner organizations,
businesses, and the public demands an organized entity. The effectiveness of the entity
8 The following list includes all the organizations supporting a focus on low-income neighborhoods in city-scale retrofit
programs: AFL-CIO Center for Green Jobs, Apollo Alliance, Bronze Investments, Building and Construction Trades
Department, AFL-CIO, Building Futures, C-Change Investments, California Construction Academy, Change to Win,
Community Action Partnership, COWS, Corps Network, DC Project, Detroiters Working for Environmental Justice,
Enterprise Community Partners, Green For All, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, International Union of
Painters and Allied Trades, Laborers' International Union of North America, Local Initiatives Support Corporation, MIT
Community Innovators Lab, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, NeighborWorks America,
Pantheon Properties, Partnership for Working Families, Policy Link, United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters,
United Steelworkers, US Green Buildings Council, YouthBuild USA.
administering the program rests on its capacity to respond to a multitude of local interests. By
incorporating program design input from local community and business stakeholders cities can
establish programs that exhibit a commitment to democratic engagement and balance various
interests. Chapter 5 addresses how the Emerald Cities Collaborative could play this directing
role.
As the first city-scale retrofit pilots unfurled over the past year in places like Seattle, Washington,
Portland, Oregon, and Babylon, New York, local governments, existing organizations, business
representatives, and in some cases, nascent administrative bodies have all contributed to
designing and steering the programs. Of these, Green for All, a national organization dedicated
to green economic development, outlined the regular activities that retrofit program entities need
to supervise, including:
e identifying the appropriate building stock and target areas
e devising a recruitment, hiring, and training strategy for all energy auditors,
workers and contractors
e arranging retrofit financing
e overseeing and coordinating work
e managing customer accounts
e quality assurance
The organization adds that a primary managing entity in each city should serve as a clearinghouse
for all retrofit program activities, though some responsibilities could be contracted out to third
parties.
Ideally, local energy retrofit programs should complement WAP by also offering services to
middle- and higher-income households, creating loan funds to expand and recycle retrofit capital
rather than WAP's grant approach, and performing deep retrofits (retrofits beyond the typical
suite of weatherization upgrades such as wall and floor insulation or heat and water system
improvements). Two cities working in innovative ways to take advantage of the energy efficiency
opportunities created by the Stimulus are Seattle and Portland. Both municipalities developed
retrofit programs they believe will extend service delivery beyond WAP and undertake the challenge
of achieving triple-bottom line returns. The following chapter compares Seattle, Portland, and
Oakland's retrofit programs in terms of the five retrofit components outlined above.
chapter three
case studies - seattle, portland, and oakland
compared
Competing Models
This analysis will examine the best practices of retrofit pilots currently underway in Portland
and Seattle - two cities that have been lauded by green economy advocates for their innovative
programs. These two cities were selected because, like Oakland, they were doing green strategic
planning prior to the Stimulus, they initiated their retrofit programs using Recovery Act funds,
and designed programs capable of growing in scale. Further, as west coast locales, Seattle
and Portland have similar climates as Oakland. The climate statistics for the three cities are
presented on the next page (see Table 1). Climate is important in that retrofit programs must be
tailored to their respective city's weather conditions. A suite of energy efficiency improvements
regularly implemented in Boston, New York, or Washington, D.C. - cities that face more extreme
winters than Seattle, Portland, or Oakland - wouldn't make the same economical sense for
the three west coast cities. Lastly, the three cities are reasonably comparable in population
size. Although their histories of federal investment and urban growth are different, and I will not
address these rich pasts here, these similarities make them productive case studies to compare.
The purpose here is to evaluate how Oakland's WERLP compares with Seattle's Green Building
Capital Initiative (GBCI) and Clean Energy Works Portland (CEWP) using the five retrofit program
components described previously. The findings reveal both the strengths of Oakland's program
relative to its counterparts as well as the ways it can be improved in terms of job creation and
increased scale.
Seattle Portland Oakland
Picture accessed at www.goseattlecard. Picture accessed at www. Picture by Michael Halberstadt
corn blog/page/2/ bankruptcyoregon.com/
Cities Compared
Seattle Portland Oakland
City Population 571,000 582,000 404,000
Average High * F 59.7 62.9 67
Average Low 0 F 44.8 45.2 52.1
Average Precipitation (in.) 37.07 37.08 23.15
Average Snowfall (in.) 7.1 3.9 0
Table 1: National Weather Service Forecast Office: Yearly averages for 1971-2000; Population data from City websites and U.S.
Census American Community Survey 2006-2008.
Beginning in May 2009, Seattle, Washington instituted GBCI. The City outlines the goals of
the program as reducing overall energy use within Seattle, increasing the energy efficiency
of its existing building stock 20% by year 2020, generating jobs, and minimizing homeowner
energy costs (City of Seattle et al. 2). Through the pilot, the Seattle Green Building Taskforce, a
stakeholder committee convened to advise the City about program policies, means to display the
economic advantage of energy efficiency to hopeful investors, utilities, businesses and residents
(Green for All, "Green For All: Case Studies from the Green Collar Economy - City of Seattle
Office of Sustainability Green Jobs Taskforce" 1). Moreover, the City of Seattle hopes that this
program can serve as a model for other American cities.
Similarly, Portland, Oregon recently initiated its CEWP plan in September of 2009. The strategy
uses ARRA funding both to promote near-term economic growth and outfit the city for sustained
social, environmental, and economic health. Two innovative achievements - on-bill financing
and a Community Workforce Agreement - could make the Portland pilot an exciting program to
model. The City boasts that the program will ultimately lay the groundwork to retrofit 100,000
homes in Multnomah County (Green for All, Clean Energy Works Portland 4).
In early 2010, Oakland launched WERLP which uses Stimulus award money to finance energy
efficiency retrofits for low-income Oakland residents. The program could retrofit between 70 and
300 units in its initial cycle. One of WERLP's most appealing features, that it does not require
loan repayment until transfer of property, is also one of its greatest liabilities in that it restricts
program capital from being easily recycled. A comparative analysis evaluating the ways Seattle,
Portland, and Oakland finance their retrofit programs, promote high road job development, work
to increase program scale, prioritize disadvantaged communities, and build partnerships between
the municipalities and community, labor and business institutions, elucidates the differences
between each of the programs. The following sections explore each of these retrofit program
elements in depth, and allow for a comprehensive understanding of their relative strengths and
weaknesses.
1) An Appropriate and Robust Financial Model
Comparison of Retrofit Programs' Revolving Loan Funds
Seattle, WA's Green Building
Capital Initiative
1. Capital Funding for Program: $3-5
million
2. Uses a revolving loan fund (RLF)
to extend EE home retrofit loans to
program participants
3. Loan amounts from $8,000-
$20,000
4. Low-interest rates (2-6%
depending on income)
5. Loan amortization periods up to 15
years (depending on income
Portland, OR's
Clean Energy Works Portland
1. Capital Funding for Program: $2.5
million
2. Uses RLF to extend EE home
retrofit loans to program
participants
3. Loan amount average: $10,700
4. Low-interest rates (2-7%
depending on income)
5. 20 year amortization period for all
loans
Oakland, CA's
Weatherization & Energy
Retrofit Loan Program
1. Capital Funding for Program: $2
million
2. Uses RLF to extend EE home
retrofits to program participants
3. Loan amounts from $6,500-30,000
4. 0% interest rate and no
amortization period. Loans paid
back when program participant
sells property or transfers the title
Table 2
The success of any large-scale retrofit program depends on its ability to reclaim the monetary
savings achieved through energy efficiency retrofits and use them to finance additional retrofits
for interested homeowners. Each of the programs analyzed herein exhibits a contextualized
finance structure intended to ensure program longevity and accessibility, but they also share
some similarities. Early in the visioning stages of GBCI's development, former Seattle Mayor
Greg Nickels chose a team of 50 local stakeholders9 to serve on the program's Green Building
Task Force. The mayor then split the Task Force into two groups, one of which would focus on
program policy design for new buildings as the other explored policy options for the City's existing
buildings. The Existing Building Task Force evaluated four funding mechanisms including (1) a
public financing pool (by establishing either a Local Improvement District or selling bonds); (2) a
private financing pool; (3) low-interest loans; and (4) energy efficiency mortgages. Ultimately, the
group determined that a combination of public and private capital would fund the initiative. The
task force defined energy efficiency retrofits as upgrades to lighting, furnaces, water heaters,
and windows, and agreed that the program would sponsor these activities.
9 The Task Force includes low-income housing providers and supporters, building owners and operators, real estate
professionals, green building experts, architects, engineers, historic preservationists, energy providers, financial
institutions, and other interested groups.
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In the case of energy efficiency retrofits, capital always stipulates the reach of a program. The
finite nature of money determines the particular scale any retrofit program will achieve: 500
units, 1000 units, or 10,000 units? As a result, program designers continue to utilize ARRA
funds in innovative ways that extend the reach of retrofit programs beyond any scale cities could
achieve alone. For instance, each of the three cities used grant funds from the Recovery Act to
establish loan funds that would finance their retrofit programs. The Obama administration sees
this as one of the great successes of the Stimulus Package, as this represents a particularly
strong development of the Act's promised outcomes (City of Oakland 1). In Seattle's case, the
City originated GBCI with seed capital from ARRA's Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block
Grant (EECBG) program.10 The city will rely on the EECBG funds to launch the program and
will seek additional support from philanthropic sources and private investors to fully finance
GBC pilot. Seattle expects that $12 million could pay for 1,000 energy efficiency home retrofits.
This amounts to an average of $12,000 per home, which almost doubles the $6,500 energy
efficiency provision limit of the Weatherization Assistance Program. The City hopes to grow
the fund to between $20 and $40 million, translating to a minimum of 1,500 and a maximum of
3,300 residential retrofits. Those numbers would build upon the 1,000 homes the City intends to
upgrade through the pilot program.
The means of financial sustainability are a critical issue for retrofit programs, and such programs
must devise a method to recycle the monetary savings achieved by energy efficiency upgrades.
In Seattle, a revolving loan fund (RLF) supplies the capital to finance its program. An RLF is
an unregulated pool of capital used to provide loans to small businesses and/or development
projects with loan repayments recycled over time. RLFs exist to address capital supply gaps in
communities and stimulate local economic development. In this case, the RLF fills the financing
gap that private investment has failed to meet. Debtors are responsible for repaying their loans
to the RLF and these repayments then allow the fund to extend new loans. Subsequently, a
revolving loan fund can produce waves of debt capital for a community (Seidman).
GBCI's loan fund provides property owners with reasonable interest rates, longer amortization
terms, and loans up to $20,000. The interest rates vary between 2% and 6% and the borrower's
income level determines their loan interest rate. The initiative allows program participants to
amortize their debt over 15 years, and again, qualifying for a longer-term payback schedule
depends on the homeowner's income. Property owners can access between $8,000 and
10 "The Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program (EECBG) provides grants to U.S. local governments,
states, territories, and Indian tribes to fund programs and projects that reduce energy use and fossil fuel emissions
and improve energy efficiency. The Program represents a Presidential priority to deploy the cheapest, cleanest, and
fastest energy sources" (Green For All citation needed; see G4A EECBG pamphlet from last summer or use another
source).
$20,000 for energy efficiency retrofits. However, in order to receive an energy efficiency retrofit
loan borrowers must pay a $450 origination fee to a local community development financial
institution (CDFI)11 that manages the loan accounts. A lien on the property suffices as collateral
for each retrofit loan (City of Seattle et al. 12; Seattle Mayor's Office 8).
Portland's CEWP program also uses a RLF Like Seattle, Portland used ARRA funds to help start
its retrofit pool, but the City also contributed its own money to the $2.5 million of seed capital
for the program. As a result, city officials continue to consider other ways to supplement and
enlarge the RLF. Issuing government bonds or assuming low-interest debt comprise two tools
city officials could use to broaden the program's financial scale. Socially conscious investors
might also increase the RLF's lending power. For example, if investors supplied the fund with
additional capital with the expectation of only a 2-3% return, the RLF could raise additional capital
and consequently provide more energy efficiency retrofit loans. However, private investment
could require the fund manager to charge retrofit loan debtors higher interest rates in order to
cover the RLF's debt to its investors. The Portland pilot program expects to retrofit 500 homes
in its first year and aspires to retrofit a total of 100,000 units in the larger Multnomah County.
On-bill financing separates Portland's CEWP from the Seattle retrofit model. In this system, the
RLF enters into a loan agreement with participating homeowners, but the fund pays contractors
directly for the retrofit work. The utility pays the aggregate costs of all energy efficiency retrofits
to the bank managing the RLF, which in turn replenishes the fund, enabling the CDFI to issue
new loans. After contractors complete all work and an Energy Advocate tests and approves the
upgrades, the utility begins charging the property owner an additional fee on her bill. This fee
represents the monthly payment plus interest that the building owner must repay to settle the loan.
The interest paid on the monthly retrofit charge guarantees a new and consistent form of profit for
the utility. The reduction in energy costs offsets some of the cost for the efficiency upgrade, but
because the utility produces less overall energy as a result of the retrofit, the interest it collects
from customers improves the energy supplier's profit margin. This model offers property owners
the ability to improve the energy efficiency of their building without expending any up-front costs.
Additionally, utilities benefit from the continued income stream without needing to boost energy
production in the form of new, extremely costly power plants.
ShoreBank Enterprise Cascadia, a CDFI operating in Oregon and Washington, will manage the
CEWP RLF for a small fee attached to each loan it advances. The RLF offers interest rates between
2% and 7% but with even longer amortization periods than the possible 15 years extended by
11 CDFls are financial institutions that provide credit and banking services to underserved communities.
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the Seattle model. CEWP recoups each loan it makes available by collecting payments over 20-
year terms. Loan amounts and monthly fees average $10,700 and $46 respectively. The deed of
trust will serve as collateral for the loan associated with a given home, but any mortgage will still
assume first position. This means that if a property owner sells a retrofitted home but has not yet
paid off the loan for the energy efficiency improvements, the bank holding the mortgage(s) must
be paid first before the RLF receives any money for outstanding fees on the retrofit loan (Green
for All, Clean Energy Works Portland 5-8; Clean Energy Works Portland, "Clean Energy Works:
Portland Frequently Asked Questions").
Oakland's retrofit program also operates via a RLF, but does so in a way different from both
the Seattle and Portland models. In January 2010, the City activated approximately $2 million
dollars of ARRA Community Development Block Grant funds to seed WERLP. Oakland's Housing
and Community Development division, the municipal office that administers WERLP, wanted
the program to serve poor and moderate-income homeowners (residents who earn up to 80%
of Area Median Income). Oakland offers WERLP participants extremely flexible terms because
the City desires that homeowners use the money to install measures that exceed traditional
weatherization retrofits so that they may maximize the investment (City of Oakland Housing and
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Community Development). Hence, homeowners can access between $6,500 and $30,000 for
energy efficiency upgrades. The RLF charges no interest on these loans and sets no amortization
period over which the loan must be repaid. Instead, Oakland recovers its investment when the
property title transfers hands. For example, when a property owner that has received money
from the City for energy efficiency upgrades sells their home, they must repay the city the cost of
the loan upon completing the sale. This replenishes the RLF and allows the city to extend new
loans. Oakland's development and redevelopment program manager, Loyd Ware, explained the
City decided that the most effective way to extend services to homeowners with limited budgets
was to stipulate loan repayment when the property title is transferred. This releases them from
having to pay another monthly bill.
The fact that all three of the programs evaluated here use revolving loan funds as the financing tool
of choice stands as a testament to the RLF's ability to fill capital gaps and finance these types of
initiatives. However, the success of the programs will depend on their ability to manage, recycle,
and procure additional loan capital over time. Still, RLFs possess many strengths that make
them an optimal instrument for economic development. The three funds outlined here align their
financing policies with their economic development goals - providing zero- or low-interest loans
to homeowners so that they might retrofit their homes to increase energy efficiency and reduce
costs. The low-interest rates and flexible payback terms encourage homeowner participation.
The faster loan amortization periods required through GBCI and CEWP should recycle program
capital faster enabling the funds to extend new loans. Also, higher loan thresholds will likely
attract property owners because they enable landlords to finance deeper retrofits and reap
greater energy efficiency gains as in the case of Oakland. Resultantly, these financing terms
should foster retrofit market growth and contribute to job and business development.
However, revolving loan funds also come with weaknesses that retrofit program managers must
monitor and minimize to meet their retrofit goals. Both the Portland and Seattle programs intend to
attract supplemental investment dollars to expand the programs. Unless Seattle can acquire the
philanthropic and private investment funding program managers expect, GBCI will fail to achieve
the level of intended scale. Portland has considered issuing government bonds or securing low-
interest debt to increase CEWP program funds. If Portland takes on debt to finance CEWP's
revolving loan fund, it could present problems for the program down the line. Capitalizing an RLF
with debt requires fund managers to charge higher interest rates to program participants to ensure
the fund can cover its own debt payments. Similar to Seattle, Portland could face problems if
it cannot attract sufficient funding to expand the pilot. Further, CEWP faces another possible
hazard: a second position on home mortgages puts the fund in a potentially precarious situation.
Energy efficiency retrofits should increase the value of a home, and since the loan must be paid
in full upon sale of the property this could bode well. However, if a property owner defaults on
their mortgage or sells the home at a lower value, homeowners will be ill-equipped or unable to
pay back the retrofit loan. As the financing is currently designed, property owners may transfer
the retrofit loan to a homebuyer at the time of sale. This requires the two parties to negotiate a
transfer fee, which could act as a deterrent for homebuyers if the loans drove up prices. CEWP
plans to explore a tariff model whereby loans would directly transfer to new homeowners at the
point of sale. Retrofit program managers refer to such loans as ones that "run with the meter"
because they remain connected to their respective properties rather than the homeowner(s) that
initiated them (Green for All, Clean Energy Works Portland). Whether CEWP on-bill financing
affects home sales in Portland will not be known until the pilot runs its course.
Oakland's WERLP revolving fund faces its own challenges. First, the fund charges no interest
on its retrofit loans. This will certainly attract people to participate in the program but it deprives
the RLF of supplemental capital that could help expand the program and extend more loans.
Likewise, loans will only be settled when a participating homeowner sells her property. This
suggests that homes retrofitted through WERLP will be priced at a value that, at a minimum,
covers the loan the owner took out to make the efficiency improvements. Regardless, the owner
of the property must pay the city the total loan amount when she sells. WERLP developers did
not create a loan loss reserve fund, meaning the fund maintains no protection against losses
or a participant's failure to repay their loan. Unless benefitting homeowners replenish the fund
by selling their home or transferring its title, Oakland's Housing and Community Development
division lacks an alternate means of recharging the RLF.
One Oakland staffer explained that the reason the City did not require WERLP participants to
repay loans over a fixed time period was so that residents would not be burdened with another
monthly bill. The City believed that lower-income or older program participants should be able
to enjoy the benefits of deep retrofits without being subjected to an additional charge. Instead,
WERLP requires that energy retrofit loans be repaid upon the sale or title transfer of upgraded
homes. This structure makes WERLP redundant to the degree that it offers energy efficiency
retrofit services to low-income local residents. The WAP provides similar services to low-income
residents, and does so in the form of grants that do not require repayment. Even though WERLP
gives poorer Oakland homeowners the opportunity to invest in more comprehensive energy
efficiency retrofits, it does not recover its loans at a pace that enables the City to expand the
program. On-bill financing, with guaranteed low-interest rates, represents a reasonable strategy
to minimize the financial strain experienced by WERLP participants, but still replenish the RLF
and offer new loans.
Since the property sale payback mechanism limits WERLP's ability to recoup and relend loan
funds, it magnifies the reality that, of the three programs, Oakland's underperforms regarding
the possible total of retrofitted units. The Oakland program could retrofit between 67 and 307
low- to moderate-income homes based on its loan option range. The Portland pilot will retrofit
500 homes in year one and Seattle's program could reach as few as 250 units and as many as
400 units given its current financing. WERLP's slow payback periods and inability to generate
additional capital for the RLF seriously hampers the program's reach and could spell significant
shortcomings in Oakland's green economic development efforts.
2) High-Road Job Development
Comparison of Retrofit Programs'_Job Development Strategies
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development pathways for poor, disadvantaged, or new workers. In addition to putting
unemployed construction hands back to work, retrofit program designers and managers can
also focus workforce development efforts in economically depressed communities. This will
contribute to the establishment of a local and economically balanced workforce that provides
jobs for people of various backgrounds (Gelman 58). Community Workforce Agreements (CWAs)
represent the most effective strategy to assure the development of high-road jobs. These
agreements define the contracting, training, and employment policies intended to produce high-
quality jobs for community members. They empower cities to set the economic development
terms of a program: which contractors can participate, whom employers hire, and the types of
benefits workers receive. Each of the programs analyzed here professes a commitment to the
creation of high-road jobs as an integral component; however the following survey reflects that
the three cities apply different approaches and standards regarding this responsibility.
Seattle's Office of Economic Development and the South Seattle Community College designed a
Residential Energy Efficiency Pathway as the primary job development tool associated with the
GBCI pilot, but thus far no CWA is connected with the program. The retrofit job ladder contains
four rungs, beginning with educational training for the least educated and least skilled energy
efficiency employment seekers. The "General Education - New worker" rung offers trainees basic
Mathematics, English, and Computer coursework. They also receive physical fitness education,
soft technical skills, safety training, and career counseling. The downside is that the first rung of
the career pathway affords no pay to trainees. In the second step of the trainees' progression,
as an "Installer," participants receive between $10-15 per hour and learn such skills as air and
duct sealing, insulation, and base energy load measures. 6th-grade Mathematics accompanies
the technical skills training. The rise to "Crew Chief" denotes a program participant's jump to
the third rung of GBCI's Residential Energy Efficiency Pathway. At this level of the career chain,
workers earn slightly more in wages ($16-17 per hour) but acquire greater responsibility. Crew
chiefs learn project management skills, energy load inspection and measurement, diagnostic
testing, combustion and appliance safety, insulation codes, and how to provide energy efficiency
installation training. Once promoted to the fourth position, "Auditor," participants learn information
concerning advanced inspection and measurement, advanced diagnostic testing, advanced
combustion appliance safety, and 12th-grade Math. This four-step apprenticeship program
will prepare workers for various positions in the energy efficiency market, including work as a
building contractor, an HVAC (heating, ventilating, and air conditioning) installer or contractor, an
energy inspector, a consumer educator, or a certified energy manager.
The commitment to design and implement a well-articulated training program for novice energy
efficiency workers as it tests the GBCI pilot program indicates Seattle's dedicated approach
to green retrofit job development. Currently, the City expects GBCI to generate 230 jobs from
the existing building policies initiated by the program. The success of the Residential Energy
Efficiency Pathway hinges on four factors. First, program managers must secure connections
with an array of energy efficiency employers and regional leaders to identify and mitigate green
retrofit workforce barriers. Second, the program must provide low-income and low-skilled
populations a means of accessing the training ladder. Only then will the program begin to offer
high-road jobs to those who need them most. Third, after completing the pilot, the Green Building
Task Force will need to evaluate, improve, and streamline the residential and commercial retrofit
career pathways the program intends to develop. Finally, Seattle could benefit from building on
other successful planning practices to better understand how to take its own program to scale
and sustainability (City of Seattle et al. 12-15).
Seattle's GBCI exhibits a number of strengths. The Residential Energy Efficiency Pathway trains
workers in a specific skill set associated with the program. It acknowledges that workers possess
different levels of education and abilities, and provides them with a number of "on ramps" to
access different rungs of the energy efficiency retrofit job ladder based on these distinctions.
Furthermore, the Seattle program prepares workers for and exposes them to other facets of the
green economy. The experience will increase their economic value and improve their lateral and
upward job movement in the field. Lastly, GBCI benefits from new legislation adopted in Seattle
this past January 2010. The ordinance mandates an energy performance disclosure from owners
of commercial and large multi-unit residential buildings. Owners of the largest buildings will
begin reporting energy performance this year, while mid-size and smaller structures would start
reporting in 2011 and 2012 respectively. The Seattle Green Building Capital Initiative Summary
Report clearly states how the city expects these policies to drive the energy efficiency retrofit
market, explaining, "By increasing the amount of information available to building owners and
occupants, measurement and disclosure of building performance will help identify opportunities
for energy efficiency gains, encourage voluntary upgrades, and create a mechanism for market
differentiation" (9). Following this logic, the policy should increase retrofit demand and generate
job growth.
The policies driving the Seattle pilot illustrate one way a city can institute an energy efficiency
retrofit strategy, but GBCI reveals some minor flaws. The initiative's growth rests on the ability
of program fund managers to attract additional RLF capital to extend new loans. The local
policymakers designed key legislation to drive the development of the retrofit market, but without
adequate financing GBCI could produce an excess demand and limited capital to cover service
delivery. In addition, the Seattle pilot lacks a CWA and therefore the mandate to enforce particular
workforce development goals such as minority training and hiring. The implementation of the
program and the outcomes it yields will evidence whether or not it has successfully produced
equitable retrofit workforce development.
In contrast, Portland's CEWP program relies on a binding agreement to generate positive
workforce development outcomes. Where the Seattle program tailored its training program to
the developing energy efficiency retrofit market, Portland's CWA influences the market to produce
the desired workforce development results. In this way CEWP's CWA can serve as a model for
other energy efficiency programs developed to induce economic and workforce development.
The CWA addresses six separate but related principles relative to workforce development: job
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quality, access, high-road employers, legal enforceability, democracy, and accountability. This
comprehensive approach aims to assert control over how the market functions to produce
greater economic equity from the energy efficiency retrofit market.
The job quality standards included in the Portland agreement center on wages, benefits, and
upward mobility. In this case, wages must equate living wages - more specifically, contractors
must pay workers any existing prevailing wage or 180% of Oregon's minimum wage, whichever
is higher. CEWP awards points to employers that provide workers with benefits, such as health
insurance, a pension plan, vacation time, or sick days. The CWA also stresses upward mobility
as a key element of good job quality standards. Importantly, the program has involved local
unions and training providers from the outset to open up job pathways for retrofit workers.
The involvement of key partners is a critical element of the next principle outlined by the CWA -
access. The agreement emphasizes the importance of local hiring, the development of a diverse
workforce, and high-quality training programs. According to the CWA, 80% of energy efficiency
retrofit workers must originate from Portland. The agreement necessitates that historically
disadvantaged" or underrepresented employees (people of color, women, or low-income
workers) must work about one-third of total work hours. The statute also requires that contractors
staff 100% of their workforce with individuals from "high-quality training programs" until such
workers assume 50% of firms jobs. Further, training programs must fulfill a set of given criteria
to be designated a qualified training program. CEWP managers believe that a proliferation of
qualified training programs can increase the pool of skilled workers from historically marginalized
backgrounds by setting a minority contract threshold. The CWA guarantees that a minimum of
20% of all contracts be granted to minority business owners.
CEWP will not succeed without a supply of high-road employers. Program managers maintain
a list of approved contractors, but contractors who wish to be added to the list must complete a
mandatory training. In addition, the CWA established an incentive-based structure to garner the
most qualified efficiency contractors for the program. Contractors receive points for their energy
retrofit experience, a positive service record, hiring local and disadvantaged workers, and having
a favorable reputation dealing with employees, city staff, and members of other organizations.
The strength of the CWA is its legal enforceability. Contractors sign legal documents that
mandate they uphold the standards outlined in the CWA. So, in contrast to the EDA's attempt for
workforce development in the 1960s, Portland's CWA excludes any energy retrofit contractors
that fail to agree to its terms.
The market regulation achieved through the CWA assures that CEWP balances disparate
interests between private business and the public sector, organized labor and non-unionized
firms, and among the assortment of participating contractors. Program managers recognized
that maintaining CEWP would be an intensive, multifaceted, and difficult task. CEWP created
the Stakeholder Evaluation and Implementation Committee (SEIC) to support the City and state
12 CEWP defines a disadvantaged worker as an individual that earns a household income less than the area median
income or faces barriers to employment such as homelessness, being a custodial single parent, receiving public
financial assistance, lacking a GED/high school diploma, or possessing a criminal record (Green for All, Clean Energy
Works Portland 11).
Energy Trust as they actualize the CWA. The SEIC retains other responsibilities, too, such as
developing new program procedures and practices to ensure CEWP delivers on its promises.
Following the pilot, the committee will begin regularly evaluating the program and realign the
it's goals as necessary. Collectively, the Portland city government, the state Energy Trust, and
SEIC not only assume responsibility for the workforce development success of CEWP, but also
the program's other environmental goals (Green for All, Clean Energy Works Portland 10-12).
Even though the Portland pilot reports it will produce only 30-40 direct jobs, the program's
comprehensive and thoughtful approach sets the stage for much greater positive economic
results (Clean Energy Works Portland, "Clean Energy Works: Portland More Frequently Asked
Questions").
Portland's CWA-based model aims to promote equitable, local, green workforce development
and some key program attributes deserve mention. The legal enforceability of the CWA grants
the SEIC power to regulate the participating contractors and determines the standards by
which they must abide. The agreement guarantees high job quality and access to training and
employment. It promotes business and employment standards for contractors. These principles
matter as Portland codifies an energy efficiency retrofit market culture. By establishing the SEIC,
the program displays a commitment to democratic input and engagement, places a value on
accountability, and stresses the importance of implementing changes when appropriate. The
CWA demonstrates how a diverse set of actors can negotiate terms that promote collective
economic benefits, a strength that cannot be understated and will be further explored later in
this paper.
The CWA model presents an attractive retrofit job driver, but characterizing it as an economic
development surety could be premature. The agreement cannot drive market growth; rather it
defines the terms governing energy efficiency retrofit workforce development standards. Similar
to the Seattle pilot, CEWP will require additional capital to generate jobs and stimulate market
expansion. Another drawback is that the CWA imposes restrictions that could dissuade some
independent contractors from participating in the program. However, if the pilot succeeds and
contractors realize that all roads to energy efficiency retrofits go through the program, they will
13 The Center for American Progress (CAP) estimated that for every $1 million invested in building efficiency retrofits
12.5 direct and indirect full-time equivalent jobs would be created. CAP claims that this target aligns with other
estimates produced by the Political Economy Research Institute, the National Association of Homebuilders, the Center
on Wisconsin Strategy and others. About 2/3 of jobs are created from energy efficiency installation and 1/3 are created
for retrofit parts and material manufacturing (Hendricks et al. 9).
CEWP claims it will produce approximately 14 jobs per every million invested in the program. Even though this number
is higher than the conservative estimates provided by CAP it is clear that if cities are going to experience large job
growth in the energy efficiency sector these programs will require much more private and public investment capital.
be forced to comply with CEWP rules. The ultimate effectiveness of Portland's CWA will rest on
its enforceability, specifically the ability of the SEIC to attract contractors even as it holds them
to strict workforce protection standards.
Much like the other two programs, Oakland's WERLP champions equity, opportunity, and high-
road job development. The City is currently producing an application for contractors to be
added to a qualified retrofit contractor list. The criteria to be listed dictate that a contractor
comply with Alameda wage standards, hire Oakland residents, and recruit workers from local
green jobs training programs like the Oakland Green Jobs Corps. Of course, all contractors will
need to show they are licensed, possess insurance, and are trained in energy retrofit standards.
Through ARRA, the City incentivized local job development. The government will reimburse
contractors who hire Oakland job seekers or graduates of local training programs 80% of paid
wages through Fall 2010.
Oakland's Weatherization and Retrofit Loan Program economic development potential leaves
more to be desired when compared with the other two programs. The City anticipates WERLP
will generate 108 project jobs, a number that at face value appears to be solid relative to the
230 positions Seattle expects from GBCI and the 30-40 jobs Portland's CEWP pilot will create
(Green for All, "Weatherization and Energy Retrofit Loan Program Summary for Oakland, CA"
2). The key difference here is that the GBCI and CEWP workforce development numbers reflect
the initial phases of the respective programs. As the Seattle and Portland program designers
developed both pilots to grow, their job creation capacity should increase at full implementation.
In comparison to Seattle's program, the absence of a CWA in Oakland poses less of a problem
because the pre-screened contractor list at least requires that energy efficiency retrofit business
owners satisfy a set of criteria to be listed. WERLP's reimbursement for local hire incentive should
also attract contractors to participate in the program. The workforce development agenda of the
Oakland program, though not as robust as GBCI or CEWP, nonetheless establishes a good base
the city can build on.
3) City and/or Regional Program Scale
The two Northwest pilot programs aim to achieve scales that will expand energy efficiency retrofits
far beyond the initial test units. Still, building up retrofit programs to serve larger populations of
residents and buildings is a difficult task, and one that requires a careful understanding of how
these retrofit programs will perform. Ladan Sobhani of the organization Green for All offers a
clarifying definition of scaled retrofit development stating, "Scale is more about the long-term
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goal and the ability to expand.. .It is about having a model and an infrastructure for this work to
[grow]" (Sobhani). Seattle and Portland intend to broaden their respective programs' reach to
retrofit large-multifamily buildings, but because the focuses of the individual pilots differ, their
building targeting strategies and policies serve separate goals. In contrast, Oakland aims to use
Stimulus CDBG funding to retrofit as many homes as possible with the understanding that the
loans will ultimately be recycled to finance future retrofits. The City solely established income
criteria for homeowners to participate in the program, and therefore does not address the age
of homes, their condition, or appropriateness for retrofitting. Of the three cities examined in this
study, only Portland explicitly evaluated the age of building stock as a targeting criteria for taking
its retrofit program to scale.
As referenced earlier, Seattle plans to retrofit 20% of the city's existing building stock by 2020.
The pilot program will test the implementation of GBCI and inform the city of changes that must
occur to best position Seattle to achieve its goal. The pilot targets owners of single-family homes
and condominiums in small multi-family buildings. Seattle will use an 18-month 5,000-unit energy
performance and home rating program to jumpstart GBCI. Interested parties may volunteer their
properties to be included in the year and a half pilot. GBCI's goals to increase program scale
and produce positive results depend heavily on the Existing Building Policies developed by the
Existing Building Task Force and the City. The Seattle Building Energy Disclosure requirement
discussed earlier indicates that the City views policy as the essential instrument to energy retrofit
scale maximization.
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Seattle intends to use the policy lever to achieve two ambitious economic development goals:
grow the local energy efficiency retrofit market and subsequently increase the scale of GBCl.
City officials believe that mandating commercial and multi-family property owners to disclose
how much energy their buildings consume will induce them to invest in energy efficiency retrofits.
They also anticipate that building owners will discover that upgrading their property to be
more energy efficient provides the supplemental benefit of increasing the overall value of their
properties. The model gambles on these beliefs when it is very possible that property owners
may conform to new regulation by disclosing energy consumption information, but not go on to
solicit energy efficiency upgrades for their buildings. This also boils down to the problem of split-
incentives between building owners and tenants. Landlords bear the responsibility of providing
energy-using appliances in buildings but tenants pay the cost of the energy they use. Hence,
building owners gain little direct benefit from any energy efficiency retrofit upgrades they invest
in. The Seattle model will clearly benefit single-family homeowners, but the jury is out regarding
how commercial property and multi-family unit owners will respond. Another factor could also
impede scale development of GBCI: the disclosure requirement strictly applies to commercial
and multi-family properties, highlighting a disconnect between the policy and those who stand to
gain most from such an initiative. Mandating single-family homeowners to disclose their energy
usage would likely require some political innovation, but it seems that one way to encourage
energy retrofits would be to market them more strategically. Finally, the disclosure ordinance
does not mandate that property owners cut energy usage, only that they disclose how much
their buildings consume. Thus, it is unclear whether GBCI will market the benefits of energy
efficiency well enough to grow the program.
Portland plans to use an alternate approach to take CEWP to scale. The method complements
Oregon state legislation, the Energy Efficiency and Sustainable Technology Act of 2009, that frees
the market of regulatory barriers that would inhibit taking large-scale retrofitting to scale. What
separates CEWP from the Seattle and Oakland models is its focus on physical characteristics of
the building stock. To participate in CEWP pilot a homeowner must live in a home constructed
prior to 1993 and less than 4,500 square feet (see Map 1 on page 53). These criteria evidence a
clear focus on older and smaller homes where energy efficiency upgrades will yield greater benefits
for property owners. CEWP managers give pilot priority to residences possessing the greatest
promise for energy savings ("Clean Energy Works Portland Pilot Application"). Even though the
CEWP pilot phase will not end until Fall 2010, program managers continue to consider both policy
and targeting approaches that will grow the program. These efforts consist of exploring such
options as pre-weatherization investments in lead and asbestos abatement; bundling properties;
community-based outreach strategies; and coordinated business support and training support
services. Pre-weatherization investments necessitate a key step in the development of healthy
Portland communities. Therefore, the City believes that retrofitting homes first to remove toxins
like asbestos, lead, and mold must occur prior to energy efficiency retrofits on homes. Portland's
City Council must either roll such healthy home upgrades into CEWP energy efficiency home
loans or create a new funding stream to finance these improvements.
The healthy home improvements impact the scale of CEWP because they create a pool of
additional units that can later receive energy efficiency retrofits. Bundling retrofits will allow
the Portland program to achieve economies of scale. Compiling adjacent properties to be
retrofitted simultaneously not only streamlines the delivery of services but also provides large-
scale contractors with opportunities to participate in the program. Producing economies of
scale with respect to energy efficiency retrofits generates cost savings and enables service
providers to reach more units. In order to alert homeowners to the benefits of energy efficiency
retrofitting, CEWP managers will utilize community-based organizations (CBOs) to assist the
city in marketing the program. These organizations often maintain closer ties to neighborhood
residents and consequently possess greater access to certain target populations (see Map 2 on
page 53).
Finally, the Portland model relies on coordinated business and training support strategies to boost
the reach of CEWP. Providing business support services gives program managers the ability
to assist smaller contractors, as well as minority- or women-owned businesses as they enter
the field of energy efficiency retrofitting. Business support services could include information
about necessary certifications, access to training programs, links to business capital, and energy
efficiency retrofitting best business practices. Another theory holds that particular populations
may be more receptive to having their homes retrofitted by members of their own cultural, ethnic,
or gender group. Hence, ensuring that a diverse number of contractors can engage the energy
efficiency retrofit market represents an important step towards market expansions. Likewise, as
the retrofit market grows contractors will require additional skilled workers to perform the work
and therefore CEWP managers must initiate connections between the building trades unions
and local training programs. Program managers will also work to promote the leading energy
efficiency retrofit practices in training curricula. In these ways CEWP can grease the rails for
individuals moving up the energy efficiency green job ladder (Green for All, Clean Energy Works
Portland 13, 14).
CEWP will need to address the split incentive problem regarding rental properties as the pilot
phase ends and the program ramps up scale delivery of energy retrofit services. All three of the
Map 1: City of Portland
Map 2: City of Portland
pilot programs in this analysis target the single-family homeowner market as the starting point to
launch energy retrofits in their cities, yet the Portland model exhibits a more complete vision of
how market expansion would occur.14 A marketing campaign promoting "healthy homes" could
serve as a primer for energy efficiency upgrades. Homeowners comprehend that hazardous
material removal improves both their quality of life and the monetary value of a home. If CEWP
could coordinate these home improvements with energy efficiency upgrades and roll the cost
into one loan for customers, then more homeowners might participate in the program.
Many cities maintain records on the age of their building stock, racial, and income distribution,
but how cities utilize this information will be critical to the equitable scaling of energy retrofit
programs. Understanding these facts enables municipalities to strategize where retrofit loan
dollars should be extended first. Based on the age and condition of a home or residential
district, and the percentages of poor homeowners in particular neighborhoods, Portland can
develop loan-targeting policies to initially concentrate retrofit efforts in these areas. Furthermore,
the inclusion of community-based organizations in the CWA creates an outreach conduit to
communities that would otherwise be unaware of CEWP. This signifies an added strength behind
the program's design. Portland will spend less by using grassroots partners to market CEWP
while still increasing energy retrofit demand. Also, CEWP's coordinated business and training
support should secure a steady supply of qualified contractors to meet expected demand.
Devising a bundling strategy, where groups of homes or residential blocks could be retrofitted
simultaneously, denotes a smart strategy that would capitalize on coordinated renovations,
program targeting policies, and intelligent marketing approaches.
CEWP's expansion model may outline smart steps to expand energy retrofitting in a city or
metropolitan area, but success in Portland is by no means guaranteed. In CEWP's case, program
results will determine success and sustainability. If program managers activate the measures
described above and streamline the process, then Portland could provide a model for other
cities to follow. Like the Seattle pilot, however, CEWP managers must ultimately attract more
capital. Achieving the goal of retrofitting 100,000 homes will be nearly impossible without it.
Oakland aims to perform energy efficiency retrofits on as many homes as possible with the $2
million it received from the Community Development Block Grant Program through the Recovery
Act. As the property titles of retrofitted buildings transfer to new owners over time, the loans will
be repaid and new weatherization and energy efficient retrofit loans will be extended to interested
14 The claim, "a more complete vision," reflects the author's analysis of the differing energy retrofit plans produced
by Seattle, Portland, and Oakland and their visions of what their respective plans will yield.
homeowners. The City understands the need to market WERLP but it will not carry out this task
on its own. In fact, Oakland's Residential Lending and Rehabilitation Services department already
announced a Request for Qualifications to solicit bids for outreach services for WERLP. The City
expects the subcontractor to perform specific duties - general outreach and referral, informing
participating contractors of the City's intention to generate jobs via the program, and conducting
follow-ups to ensure job quality and customer satisfaction (Green for All, "Weatherization and
Energy Retrofit Loan Program Summary for Oakland, CA" 2). Oakland's Department of Housing
and Community Development (DHCD), the office responsible for administering WERLP, will not
charge the marketing organization with growing the program. That would require additional
funding and a finance mechanism capable of recycling program loans at a faster rate. As a
result, WERLP will assuredly retrofit some Oakland homes, but subsequent waves of energy
efficiency retrofits will depend on the how long it takes the RLF to recoup loans."
In the absence of an expansion model for WERLP, Oakland's DHCD staff can focus on developing
a cadre of qualified contractors, promoting local hiring practices, ensuring quality service
delivery, and evaluating the program. Prioritizing quality service delivery simplifies the program
and enables managers to set and strive for manageable goals. The limited reach of the Oakland
program obviously means that many low- to moderate-income homeowners will go unserviced,
exactly those that the program aims to assist. Oakland recently submitted an innovative federal
grant proposal describing a plan to retrofit affordable housing units, buildings operated by the
Oakland Housing Authority and city schools, but beyond WERLP no plan exists to expand energy
retrofits beyond single-family homes.
4) Focus on Low-Income Service Delivery and Job Development
In their own respective ways, each of these programs acknowledges the needs of low-income
families. Seattle's GBCI pilot targets homeowners who do not qualify for the City's HomeWise
program, which provides low-income renters and homeowners at or below 200% of the federal
poverty level with weatherization grants. GBCI will address the needs of low-income city residents
through its workforce development strategy, and the Task Force recognizes that creating access
for disadvantaged workers will be one of its larger challenges. The GBCI Task Force claims that
in order to promote success the program must, "increase the number of on-ramps.. .for low-
skilled, low-income residents to acquire clean energy workforce skills," but it offers no policy
regarding how it will achieve this. The energy efficiency career pathways established by GBCI
15 The brief analyses of Oakland's financing, high-road job development, and scale development plans are not the
result of a lack of available information on the program; rather, they reflect WERLP's simplicity in comparison to the
more comprehensive programs implemented in Seattle and Portland.
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articulate how an individual with no or few skills could climb an energy retrofit job ladder, but its
commitment to train low-income might merely amount to an unrealistic hope if the Task Force
fails to funnel disadvantaged workers into those programs.
Oakland's WERLP only offers services to low- and moderate-income people. By incentivizing
contractors to hire from local training programs like the Ella Baker Center's Oakland Green Jobs
Corps, the City indirectly influences workforce development opportunities for Oakland workers
- some from poor, disadvantaged, or minority backgrounds. WERLP's targeting policy and
support for local job development deserve note, but the program's limited capacity will ultimately
hinder the its ability to make large-scale energy retrofit or job creation impacts. In the event that
Oakland DHCD decides to expand the program, WERLP represents a good platform to build
upon.
The Portland pilot best incorporates policies that promote low-income service delivery and
workforce development. In that sense, CEWP is a model hybrid of the Seattle and Oakland
programs. The CWA sets baselines for job quality and access; it produces standards for
contractors rewarding those that deliver the best value. Community-based outreach, coordinated
business and training support services will all help promote and grow CEWP. Portland's synthesis
of values and policy gives it an edge over the Seattle and Oakland programs. The model sets the
bar high and challenges the SEIC to fulfill the program's pledge of retrofitting 100,000 over the
next ten years. Achieving even a fraction of that number would mark a huge success, especially
for disadvantaged homeowners and workers prioritized through the program. In time, we will
know whether Portland's CWA can prove stronger than the EDA workforce commitments to
Oakland in the late 1960s.
.........
5) The Role of Partnerships
Comparison of Retrofit Programs' Working Partnerships
Seattle, WA's Green Building Portland, OR's and CA'S Wetriton
Capital Initiative Clean Energy Works Portland Progm
1. 50 stakeholders assembled 1. 12 institutions 1. Program only establishes
to form the program Policy collaborated to develop relationships between
Task Force the program contractors and local
training programs.
2. 29 institutions representing
Wi Portland City government,z business interests, labor
and community signed
the CWA. This serves as a
checks-and-balances
system -
Table 6
The EDA program intended to build community confidence by creating an Employment Plan
Review Board that included business, labor, and neighborhood representatives. While the board
had to approve all project plans, it did not have power to terminate a project if the contractors failed
to meet their hiring quotas. Therefore, it is not enough to simply include partners in the process
of developing retrofit programs, they must also have power to influence their implementation. Of
the three energy retrofit models presented here, only Oakland launched its program without any
business, community, or labor partners. The City of Seattle enlisted 50 stakeholders to assemble
GBC1's task force. They represent an array of perspectives and stem from the private sector as
well as community-based organizations. These stakeholders make up the New and Existing
Buildings Committees that are responsible for program policy design. Their commissions charge
them with developing the financing, incentive, and mandate policies that will secure GBCI's role
in greenhouse gas emission reductions.
The Seattle program assembled a range of individual stakeholders, representing business and
organizational interests, to serve as committee members for one of two task forces. This structure
draws upon the expertise of these individuals and provides them with an opportunity to shape
program policies that reflect the interests of their respective constituencies. The Seattle Green
Building Task Force Charter outlines the role of Task Force committee members stating:
Task Force members will help the City think through policy options for meeting
these [greenhouse gas emission reduction goals and targets by reviewing
option packages for feasibility, likelihood of success and compatibility!
synchronization with other state, regional, national, and international efforts;
participants will not be debating the pros and cons of the goals or targets.
Information shared during the meetings will inform staff recommendations to the
Mayor, which will include near- and long-term milestones for the implementation
of improved and/or new regulatory and programmatic measures to support the
Mayor's Green Building Capital Initiative (2).
The statement above clarifies that the two task forces will play an advisory role and that formal
GBC decisions will occur at the city level. So, while admirable of the Mayor's Office to incorporate
such a heterogeneous group of stakeholders, an alternate program development approach might
have involved these stakeholders helping the City to both define goals and design measures to
meet them. Without a process that prioritizes constituent input, at least to the extent of granting
Task Force recommendations increased weight in the decision-making process, the City of
Seattle controls all decisions governing its retrofit program.
Community Workforce Agreements deny any single entity total control of a program, creating the
opportunity for community controlled economic development. 16 Portland's CEWP is an example
of shared control and responsibility among the various partners. The Program website lists
12 collaborators that joined with the City and the Federal government to bring CEWP to light.
The CEWP Program Summary highlights the roles of 11 different stakeholders ranging from
building owners and neighborhood groups, to the financial and administrative managers, and the
utilities. Even though the City of Portland and Energy Trust administer CEWP, assigning different
responsibilities to program partners assures that various constituencies play active roles in the
program. Twenty-nine separate parties signed the CWA, and this legally binding document
works as a "check and balance" instrument to moderate smart, equitable development of the
home energy efficiency retrofit sector in Portland (see Figure 5 on next page).
A number of astute and forward-thinking organizations committed to expanding the energy
efficiency retrofit sector in Oakland and larger Alameda County exist in the area. The inability of
the City to take full advantage of this resource represents a missed opportunity in WERLP's design
and development, but this is not meant to construe that Oakland cannot still modify its retrofit
program with input from these available partners. For example, in developing an application for
contractors to be added to the pre-screened contractor list, the City has displayed a commitment
to promote a particular green energy retrofit work standard. The screening process will allow the
City to establish good relationships with quality contractors that will be necessary allies should
Oakland pursue a larger retrofit strategy in the future. Additionally, the City will likely capitalize
on local workforce development programs like the Oakland Green Jobs Corps. Helping place
program graduates in positions in the local energy retrofit field will build confidence in green
16 In this case I use "community" to mean collective participation by a number of actors including but not limited to
non-profit organizations, the local utility, regional government entities, and the City of Portland.
CEWP Signees
Government
* The City of Portland
e Portland Development Commission
Community Organizations
* Coalition for a Livable Future
e Green For All
I lrvington Covenant CDC
* Metropolitan Alliance for Common Good
e Urban League of Portland
e Native American Youth Family Center
e Oregon Action
Other Non-Profit Organizations
e Energy Trust of Oregon
* Oregon Apollo Alliance
Environmental/Energy Organizations
* Eco Tech, LLC
* Home Energy Life Performance Group, Inc.
* Sustainable Solutions Unlimited
Economic Development
* Neil Kelly Corporation
e Worksystems, Inc.
* Verde
Labor Organizations
e Carpenters Union Local 247
* Change to Win
" Construction Apprentice & Workshop Solutions
* Evening Trades Apprenticeship Preparation
* Liuna Laborers Local 483
* Metropolitan Contractor Improvement Partnership
e National Association of Minority Contractors of
Oregon
* Oregon AFL-CIO
* Pacific Northwest Carpenters Institute
e Portland Youthbuilders
* Oregon & Southern Idaho Laborers-Employers
Training Trust
* Oregon Tradeswomen
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jobs training programs and strengthen connections with union and non-union labor contractors.
Regardless, the activation of WERLP and the partners involved will support the burgeoning
retrofit market in Oakland. The following chapter will discuss and analyze Oakland's efforts in
greater detail.
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4. Low-interest rates (2-7%
depending on income)
5. 20 year amortization period for all
loans
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Oakland, CA's Weatherization
and Energy Retrofit Loan
Program
1. Capital Funding for Program: $2
million
2. Uses RLF to extend EE home
retrofits to program participants
3. Loan amounts from $6,500-30,000
4. 0% interest rate and no
amortization period. Loans paid
back when program participant
sells property or transfers the title
1. Tool: Qualified Contractor Criteria
and Local Hire Incentives
2. Expected Job Creation: 108
1. Marketing strategy to advertise
program
1. Program limited to low- and
moderate-income homeowners
2. Contractor incentives for hiring
employees from local training
programs, some of which are from
poor, disadvantaged, or minority
backgrounds
1. Program only establishes
relationships between
contractors and local
training programs.
chapter four
a vision of the future: a city-wide oakland
retrofit model
The preceding analysis of three separate city approaches to implementing energy efficiency
retrofits highlights a number of best practices and some worth avoiding. One salient fact that
should be noted is that the cities themselves assumed a lead role to establish these programs.
In Portland and Seattle the mayors led the charge, challenging city departments to craft policies
that would ensconce energy efficiency as an environmental boon and an economic driver. Both
mayors' offices sought support and input from a wide range of partners and in different ways
built those connections into the decision-making process. Those partnerships helped develop
program platforms that balanced community benefits and economic growth. Both municipalities
believe their respective programs will grow to scale so that thousands of residents beyond
the pilot participants will enjoy the rewards of cheaper energy, an improved environment, and
increased economic opportunities.
Oakland's WERLP also displays some strengths that point the program in the right direction. As
mentioned earlier in this paper, the City's pre-screening criteria for contractors will institute good
relations with valuable retrofit contractors, and its support of local training programs places the
city in a facilitator role, coupling the local green labor supply with employers. These actions
represent a good start, but Oakland could do much more to maximize federal dollars and expand
WERLP. It would be unfair to criticize the City without acknowledging other steps Oakland has
made to optimize its ARRA funding and advance energy efficiency retrofit practice. In addition
to activating WERLP, Oakland submitted a grant proposal to fund its "Green for All Initiative."
The City teamed with the Oakland Unified School District, the Oakland Housing Authority, and
Enterprise Community Partners (Enterprise), and drafted a plan to retrofit 16 school buildings,
683 multi-family affordable housing units, and 35 Housing Authority buildings. Oakland would
greatly benefit if the government awarded the City this Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block
Grant. The proposal represents an inventive way to retrofit schools and multi-family housing but
the strategy will only be possible if it receives government support. The need for subsidies does
not undermine the value of the proposal, but it underlines the demand for an alternate retrofitting
model that can sustain itself as it expands. The Portland CEWP provides a comprehensive
example of how this can be achieved, but Oakland can also glean aspects of Seattle's GBCI to
upgrade its retrofit plan. The following section will explore what this program would look like in
Oakland, the parties that could help bring it to bear, and some of the potential outcomes and
barriers. The recommendations that accompany this plan identify actions and roles for the City
of Oakland, community-based organizations, labor representatives, and other non-profit actors.
Retrofit Oakland
On March 10, 2010 Oakland hosted a contingent of federal officials to publicize the local
community benefits from Stimulus funds. In an article covering the event, Oakland Tribune
correspondent Kelly Rayburn reported that, "[Mayor] Dellums said Oakland set a high standard
for itself when asking for Stimulus money. The goal.. .was not simply to receive money and
spend it, but rather to leverage it with local government, non-profit and private-sector programs
to help build sustainable economic opportunities." Maybe the City has successfully met this goal
in other Stimulus-funded programs, but it appears that WERLP's design affords the government
a limited return on investment. Both Seattle and Portland utilized similar amounts of money
to seed their individual energy retrofit programs and developed far more ambitious proposals
for what those programs could achieve. Oakland certainly deserves credit for the more than
$200 million of Stimulus funds it won from the Recovery Act, and orchestrating such a massive
injection of money in a condensed time frame is surely a daunting endeavor. Nevertheless,
the tools and partners exist in Oakland to augment WERLP so that Mayor Dellums' vision for
Recovery Act funding might be realized.
A city-scale Oakland retrofit model will require that the city office responsible for WERLP, the
Community and Economic Development Agency:
1) restructures how the RLF recycles program loan payments;
2) improves job opportunities for Oakland workers;
3) involves multiple city agencies and enlists the planning expertise, support, and
capacity of local community and non-profit organizations;
4) outlines a policy to prioritize low-income service delivery and job development;
and
5) analyzes the local building stock and population demographics to devise a
retrofit strategy.
In these ways Oakland could simultaneously satisfy the Obama Administration's hope for the
Stimulus and Mayor Dellums' vision for what government investment could mean for the City.
A redesign of WELRP could also help prove that Oakland has learned from previous Federal
investment experiments and seeks a more sustainable form of economic development.
1) Revise the RLF and Find a CDFI Partner to Manage the Fund
Oakland already established a RLF to recycle WERLP loans, but the payback mechanism cannot
reasonably recover loans in a timeframe to scale-up the program. The Portland and Seattle RLFs,
with their discrete amortization periods, assure that the funds will be replenished at a faster rate.
Oakland must establish a dependable loan amortization schedule that offers low-interest rates to
poorer residents but still ensures that the RLF can extend new loans. Additionally, a revised RLF
can also leverage private investment to subsidize program growth. Maryann Leshin of Enterprise
stressed the importance of dependable financing for city-wide retrofit plans stating, "...scale is
all about money." Without additional capital it would be unrealistic to think that any program
could grow to city-wide scale, "Unless," adds Leshin, "the utilities and federal government came
in and said we can provide that matching resource." Oakland should follow Seattle's example
and pursue investment from philanthropic and private sources. The capital boost will certainly
help WERLP grow in scale.
The City possesses a partner capable of managing this type of RLF in Enterprise Community
Partners. It is a national non-profit committed to affordable housing and community development.
The organization already operates a community loan fund, and as a licensed CDFI, the U.S.
Treasury backs all loans it extends. Moreover, for six years Enterprise has administered the
Enterprise Green Communities Program, which provides financial support and technical assistance
to energy efficient developers. Since Enterprise partnered with Oakland in its Energy Efficiency
and Conservation Block Grant proposal, the organization is an obvious choice to manage a more
dynamic retrofit loan fund. In order to pursue a course that incorporates on-bill financing, the
city, the accompanying financial partner, and the local utilities would need to broker a deal. While
not an easy process, Portland secured on-bill financing agreements with three utilities that serve
CEWP areas. The energy companies accepted a role in which they collect the loan payments
and transfer them to ShoreBank, but they collect homeowner utility bills before loan payments
in the event that customers do not pay enough to cover both fees. This safety net ultimately
protects the utilities from financial losses.
2) Use Policies to Promote Job Growth
Oakland should adopt similar policies to those initiated in Seattle and Portland that promote
local energy efficiency workforce development. Seattle passed local legislation to spur the
growth of its energy retrofit market - the Energy Disclosure requirement will inform property
owners of the energy their buildings consume and encourage voluntary upgrades. The City
believes that more property owners will invest in energy efficiency retrofits and such activity will
promote market growth and therefore boost job development. Conversely, Portland established
a CWA to guarantee certain workforce development outcomes, mandating that contractors
abide by certain rules in order to participate in the program. Oakland should consider the gains
presented by these different approaches, and explore how it could institute comparable policies
that encourage job growth but manage job standards.
Oakland's pre-screened contractor list functions similar to the contractor qualifications and
requirements policies delineated in CEWP's community workforce agreement. Likewise,
Oakland's support of the Green Jobs Corps and the ARRA-financed contractor incentives for
hiring trainees from local programs echo analogous job access mandates decreed by Portland's
CWA. The legally binding nature of the CWA distinguishes Portland's model from Oakland's
program. WERLP can regulate the contractors that participate in the program and stress that they
hire locally trained workers, but the plan offers great leeway in terms of job quality and access.
Program managers should continue to pre-screen contractors based on their compliance with
Alameda County wage standards, hiring of local residents, and recruitment from local green job
training centers. These represent good practices that promote certain standards. However,
they should not be equated with the standards achieved by Portland's CWA, which set a family-
supporting wage, highlight contractors that provide benefits to workers, stipulate a minimum
percentage of disadvantaged workers or local trainees that must be hired, or prioritize contracts
for businesses owned by people of color and women. In Portland, the collective parties
represented in the CWA can deny participation to union and contractor signatories that fail to
comply with the practices outlined in the document. This affords the City of Portland and the
community great leverage to exact worker benefits and job quality standards from contractors.
Conversely, contractors must assume accountability for their hiring and work practices. Critics
of CWA regulations might suggest that these restrictions will constrain the energy retrofit market
and hinder contractors from participating in the program. Perhaps this outcome could unfold if
enough retrofit contractors shied away from the program because of the CWA restrictions, but
Portland's analysis of the building stock appropriate for energy retrofits suggests that a huge
unmet demand exists. Given this demand and the high numbers of unemployed tradesworkers,
it becomes difficult to rationalize how a majority of contractors would not jump at the opportunity
to participate in the program. An analysis of Oakland's building stock could incite similar interest
from contractors.
3) Involve Multiple City Agencies, Community and Non-Profit Organizations
In all three case studies, city agencies play critical roles supervising their respective retrofit
programs. Seattle's Office of Sustainabilty and Environment takes the lead on GBCI, whereby
Portland's Bureau of Planning and Sustainability performs administrative duties for CEWP. In
Oakland, the Housing and Community Development office within the City's Community and
Economic Development Agency directs WERLP. However, Oakland varies from the other two
programs in that it overlooked how a broader retrofit strategy could yield greater economic and
community benefits by collaborating with the many potential partners that exist in the city. Green
For All helped Portland craft CEWP and the community workforce agreement that supports it.
In that city, more than two-dozen external parties endorsed the CWA, with almost half assuming
key program duties. Seattle also conscripted individuals from diverse backgrounds for its GBCI
Task Forces to help develop the policies guiding its energy retrofit program. In contrast, except
for promoting the Green Jobs Corps and defining program participation terms for contractors,
Oakland has ignored the wealth of input and support that local organizations could provide. In one
instance of collaboration, the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights joined with the Oakland Apollo
Alliance, Laney College, Cyprus Mandela Construction Training Program, and Growth Sector,
Inc. to establish the Oakland Green Jobs Corps. The program trains workers for careers in Bay
Area green industries such as green construction, energy efficiency, and solar. The collective
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expertise of these institutions could help the City draft job quality and access standards for an
Oakland green retrofit CWA. The East Bay Alliance for a Sustainable Economy, a Bay Area non-
profit organization committed to economic and social justice, issued a paper in 2007 referencing
the gains the City could enjoy from a more developed local green economy. Still, city officials did
not involve the organization when developing WERLP. One clearly absent partner is the Alameda
Building Trades. In order to design a more ambitious and impactful energy retrofitting strategy,
Oakland must coordinate with the tradesgroups that would certainly be involved in the work.
Also, organizations such as Enterprise Community Partners or Bay Area LISC could assist the
City in developing new loan products and RLF management practices.
4) Prioritize Historically Disadvantaged Groups
Many energy retrofit program supporters argue that these strategies should focus on low-income
job development and service delivery. To reiterate key facts: Oakland's unemployment rate,
18% in January 2010, was more than 1.5 times the national average; almost one-fifth of Oakland
residents earn incomes at the federal poverty level; and nearly half of all Oaklanders spend
roughly 30% of their earnings on housing costs. These three points plainly underscore why
the City must make every effort to increase job growth targeted at less affluent populations,
and that an expanded energy retrofit program could ameliorate multiple problems facing low-
income Oakland residents. Many of the partner organizations listed in Figure 6 have strong
ties to underprivileged city communities and could effectively conduct outreach efforts and
market an expanded city retrofit program. Given President Obama's commitment to green job
development for disadvantaged workers and Mayor Dellums' claims regarding how Oakland
should use Stimulus funds, no other program seems more appropriate for investment and
capable of addressing a multitude of city problems than an expanded WERLP.
5) Consider Means to Increase Program Scale by Analyzing Building Stock and
Demographic Data to Shape Program Targeting Policies
Energy Efficiency retrofit program designers believe that incorporating rental properties and
bundling retrofits are two factors that could induce larger contracting companies to enter the
field by facilitating the scale development of programs. Including rental properties would greatly
expand the total number of units or structures that cities could retrofit and bundling properties
streamlines the process creating economies of scale. Profiting from individual retrofits would
be nearly impossible for big contracting firms due to their higher operational costs, but bundling
a group or groups of buildings to retrofit simultaneously could stimulate interest from bigger
companies. Retrofit program designers hope that incorporating rental buildings and bundling
properties will subsequently produce diverse business participation and improve service delivery.
These probable gains explain why cities like Portland are already exploring ways to structure
practices like bundling and rental retrofits into their programs.
In order to determine where Oakland should target its retrofit efforts, the City must understand
which residents could benefit most from the program and the housing stock that is most in
need of upgrades. To devise a targeting strategy for CEWP, Portland program managers set
participation criteria and then mapped those homes that fulfilled the City's specifications. To
qualify for the program homes must be pre-1993 owner-occupied single-family dwellings. In
order to best understand which city residences could benefit most from energy retrofits, the City
also mapped household income by neighborhood, race distribution by neighborhood, average
gas heating energy intensity, and total greater than median energy intensity (revisit Maps 1 and
2 on page 53). Analyzing these metrics will outline the populations of Portland residents that
live in the oldest housing stock, pay higher than median costs for energy use, and expend larger
proportions of their disposable income for energy. Understanding these facts should assist
CEWP managers design an implementation plan that initially focuses service delivery in areas
where homeowners in older, less efficient homes pay high than average energy costs.
An examination of Oakland's building stock, reveals that the City could devise an energy retrofit
strategy based on similar metrics as those used by Portland. Of the 98,862 parcels that fill
Oakland's borders, the City Planning and Zoning Department keeps build date records for most
properties. The City does not have data for 18% of the total parcel stock, but the remaining
information tells a revealing story about the age of Oakland's building stock, how appropriate it
is for energy retrofits, and the individuals who could benefit most from an expanded program.
Map 3 (page 68) segments Oakland into district zones with the maroon, yellow, light blue, and
orange zones comprising the City's flatland neighborhoods (broadly including West Oakland,
East Oakland, Fruitvale, Chinatown, and East lake). As Oakland developed, people settled these
areas first. Map 4 illustrates all Oakland parcels (parcels with build dates reflect that a building
exists at the site) developed prior to 1900, approximately 3,600 lots. By 1940 development in
Oakland exploded and builders constructed 49,000 structures as the City's population boomed
to fill wartime jobs (Map 5). Another 22,000 buildings originated between 1941 and 1980, while
some 6,100 lots were developed over the last 30 years (Maps 6 & 7). The black areas of Map 8
highlight those parcels absent of build dates in the City's records. It should be noted that an area
colored black does not denote that the parcel remains empty (as the Oakland port located in the
City's northwest corner and airport situated in the southwest corner along the Bay are both fully
developed and operational), but rather the City simply lacks data associated with these parcels.
Map 3: City of Oakland
These maps show that even when the "no data" parcels are included, 53% of the City's structures
stood by the time the United States entered World War II. The Oakland Planning and Zoning
Department does not maintain data files that distinguish residential homes from commercial and
industrial properties, but these maps clearly articulate that some 52,000 structures are at least
70 years old, most of them located in the flatland neighborhoods.1 7
A study of American homes revealed an average age of 40 years. The study also stated that
residences in this age group consume about 40% more energy than those built after the millennium.
17 The Oakland Planning and Zoning Division (PZD) should work to collect build dates for those parcels currently
tagged "no data." Additionally, PZD should follow Portland and distinguish single-family residential units from other
parcels zoned for alternate uses. A comprehensive understanding of the City's building stock would empower Oakland
officials to design an optimal retrofit targeting strategy.
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Based on age alone, the above maps show that 76% of Oakland buildings maintain pre-1980
build dates. With more accurate information regarding the near 18,000 properties classified "no
data" this percentage might actually spike higher. While these maps fail to highlight the ages of
Oakland's single-family residences, which would help the City comprehend the potential home
energy retrofit market, they do make a compelling argument that an untapped building retrofit
market exists. If packaged correctly within a broader City retrofit plan, these facts could induce
the Alameda Building Trades Council to look closer at the potential job growth and economies of
scale that could be achieved from this opportunity.
An analysis of median home incomes and racial distribution in Oakland provides additional detail
regarding which areas a city home energy retrofit program would target first. Maps 9 and 10
display the median income and minority distribution by block group in the City. As stated earlier,
poor people spend four times more for energy as the average American family, and black and
Hispanic families spend markedly higher utility costs than whites (Affordable Power Alliance 4).
The median income distribution map shows that the City's wealth concentrates on the eastern
side of the city, with the greatest affluence in Oakland's northeastern hill neighborhoods. The
minority distribution map exhibits the proportion of people in each block group that are minorities.
The darkest cells of the map contain the highest percentages of minority residents. The flatland
neighborhood block groups distinctly possess the largest proportions of minority inhabitants.
When compared with the building stock and racial distribution maps, we can see that some of
Oakland's oldest buildings house a number of the city's poorer minority residents (See Map 11).
To maximize benefits for those most in need of help, a broadened Oakland home retrofit plan
would likely target a neighborhood like West Oakland as an optimal place to bundle properties.
The high concentration of prewar structures and proportion of poor minorities make it an ideal
place to test the possibility of bundling home energy retrofits. Targeting retrofits in this area would
provide relief to a portion of the City's population that, on average, pays a larger proportion of its
income on housing costs than middle- or upper-class residents. With a CWA, WERLP could also
prioritize the training and hiring of West Oakland workers. In these three ways, Oakland could
grow the program to its full potential.
By expanding WERLP in these ways, the City of Oakland could drastically improve its carbon
footprint, the lives of residents, and job opportunities for the unemployed. Building out the
program as proposed here will require that the City increases internal coordination between city
agencies; solicits private, non-profit, and labor partners to participate in new program design
and task management; diversifies its workforce development and program delivery strategies;
and performs a more detailed analysis of the building stock to identify the build dates for single-
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family residences. A host of reasons exist to support this cause. Last summer, Oakland Council
members unanimously passed an Energy and Climate Action Plan committing the City to slash
greenhouse gas emissions to 36% below 2005 figures by 2020. The unemployment rate in
the City exceeds the national average by seven points, 18% of residents live in poverty, and
the vast majority of the building stock is more than 30 years old and could benefit from energy
retrofits. WERLP's expansion is fundamental for achieving the City's environmental mandates
and addressing the insidious inequality that has plagued Oakland for decades.
chapter five
securing change: implications for oakland's
community, non-profit, and other partners
At times of national economic distress the federal government has enacted policies to stimulate
growth and development. Oakland, California twice served as either a key or the sole benefactor
of the government's economic development policies. The World War II worker recruitment
efforts and the EDA urban job program were both workforce development strategies, neither of
which produced lasting positive results for the City. The recent recession prompted the federal
government to pass the Stimulus bill, which poured over $20 billion for energy efficiency programs
into the U.S. economy. To date, Oakland has received over $200 million - of which $70 million
was granted for workforce development and energy efficiency programs - representing a third
wave of federally-sponsored economic development funding for the City.
Innovative leaders in Portland and Seattle used Stimulus awards to design home energy retrofit
loan programs that pledge to create job opportunities for a diverse set of workers and grow to
scales that will extend services to residents across their cities. Understanding the strengths
and weaknesses of these other programs is critical to designing better strategies for city-scale
retrofitting. Oakland, too, initiated a retrofit program, but in its current iteration it lacks the
necessary elements to deliver the results envisioned by the Recovery Act - specifically the jobs
and financial relief many city residents so desperately need. Oakland's Stimulus success (the
city has already secured almost $206 million in ARRA funds and has another $217 million of
pending grant proposals) could actually hinder its ability to focus adequate attention toward
improving its home energy retrofit loan program. The government set a strict time schedule for
cities to use ARRA awards, meaning that Oakland must act fast to activate its Stimulus grants. If
the City is truly committed to maximizing government dollars to stimulate local job growth, then
revising WERLP immediately represents a sound strategy to do so. Considering how inundated
the City is managing multiple Stimulus projects, local community and non-profit organizations
can provide needed support and help shape the scope of an expanded energy efficiency retrofit
program. The recommendations below directly relate to the opportunity to reform WERLP
and garner greater job opportunities and services for Oakland residents, but they also stem
from tough lessons derived from the City's two previous experiences with government-backed
economic development.
Recommendations for Community-Based Organizations and Local Non-Profits
CBOs and Non-Profits should define their own CWA terms and present them to the City.
The strength of CWAs resides in their ability to impose particular standards built on the notion of
shared gains for all involved parties. Oakland's preoccupation with its other ARRA responsibilities
presents local organizations with a critical opportunity to define their own set of CWA terms. A
number of experienced CBOs and non-profits with firm connections to the community exist
in Oakland. The meeting described in the Preface - where a number of community and labor
interests met to discuss whether Oakland should become an Emerald City - demonstrates that
Oakland organizations will explore partnering on common interest issues. Ladan Sobhani of
Green for All mentioned that organizations must focus on the fact that Oakland is presently
implementing WERLP, suggesting the need for immediate action. However, while I agree that
local organizations should address WERLP with the City, it is most important that these groups
identify the outcomes a CWA should produce, articulate its benefits, and draft strategies to bring
it to fruition. Such a plan would communicate to the City that the community is organized and
has developed a formula to promote social equity, economic justice, environmental improvement,
and business development.
One issue that could complicate this process is that the Oakland mayoral seat will be contested
in November 2010, and many of these local organizations may be reluctant to expend political
capital on this agenda at this time. One path around this problem would be to use the organizing
capacity of community groups to disseminate information about the underperforming WERLP.
If citizens groups called for WERLP reform to improve job opportunities and access to services,
community organizations could assume a leadership role and advocate in favor of a public
demand. This would establish grounds for CBOs and non-profits to bring WERLP reform and
CWA issues to the City, hold the City accountable for how it uses taxpayer dollars, and force
public officials to pay attention to highly politicized issues of unemployment, poverty, and
environmental degradation.
CBOs/Non-prof its should form a coalition with quality non-union contractors. A partnership
between community organizations and quality non-union contractors affords both groups greater
power in a push for an energy retrofit program CWA. Some quality non-union retrofit contractors
would likely align with CWA goals, such as diverse hiring practices, paying living wages, and
promoting skill development. If the Alameda Building Trades express a desire for inclusion in
any CWA (which they likely will given community promotion of energy efficiency retrofits), the
early CBO/non-union contractor partnership would guarantee bargaining power for the partners.
In this way Oakland organizations could negotiate equitable terms for both organized and non-
union contractors in the CWA.
CBOs/Non-profits should disseminate information regarding the limitations of WERLP to
other organizations. The Obama Administration has espoused transparency and accountability
as essential ARRA values. Sharing information with other organizations can help keep cities honest
about the use of Recovery Act funds and program outcomes. In doing so, local organizations
advance the democratic engagement of other community actors and contribute to government
oversight. Communities should be highly skeptical and critical of government funded economic
development policies. This is especially true in Oakland, where previous government programs
failed to generate meaningful and lasting economic results in certain city communities. The fact
that taxpayers or their descendants will ultimately repay dividends from the Recovery Act justifies
citizens' right to demand accountability. The literature criticizing the lack of government support
of workers after World War II and the ineffective EDA policies in the cities provides ample support
for the need for accountability. The Recovery Act is no different and therefore organizations must
spread information regarding the spending of Stimulus funds to empower the community to hold
government officials accountable.
A Role for Emerald Cities Collaborative in Advancing a New Oakland Retrofit
Program
Any city seeking to initiate an energy retrofit loan program that promotes worker equity should
pursue some standard activities: a CWA to engender a high-road program, partnerships that
share program tasks, and a level of scale to maximize service delivery. The unfortunate reality
is that many cities lack the capacity, knowledge, and necessary partners to establish these
programs. In such cases, Emerald Cities Collaborative can play an important coordinating
role. Still, the Oakland situation is somewhat different because the City is endowed with smart,
active, innovative, and progressive community and non-profit organizations whose missions
dovetail with ECC values. The Alameda Building Trades recently signed on as an Emerald Cites
Oakland partner, leaving only the Mayor's office and the business community as the remaining
uncommitted stakeholders.
As an umbrella organization, ECC can fill gaps in capacity and perform duties that will support
Oakland and its community, labor, and business partners to ensure that WERLP is refined into a
high-road program. First, ECC can help bring the city and business community to the table.
Developing a more robust retrofit plan like the one presented earlier in this paper represents the
best way for Oakland to guarantee that one Stimulus program achieves Mayor Ron Dellums'
goal: leveraging federal dollars with local government, non-profit and private-sector initiatives
to generate sustainable economic development in the City. Retrofit contractors obviously stand
to benefit from an expanded energy retrofit program. Soliciting an ECC commitment from the
Mayor's office and local businesses can show Oakland residents that disparate stakeholders
believe a new city retrofit strategy can succeed where other economic development initiatives
have failed.
Second, ECC can mediate the CWA development process. By signing the ECC threshold
agreements the City, local businesses, organized labor and community organizations commit
to working together for the purpose of advancing ECC goals. While the agreement is not
legally binding, it does condition that committing to ECC equates a pledge to collectively draft
a community workforce agreement, which is a legally binding document. As an outside party,
ECC can facilitate the design and negotiation process. This frees any one stakeholder group
from playing the dual roles of administrator and advocate. It empowers each group to support
their own agenda knowing that an external body can help negotiate the terms.
Third, ECC can lobby the city and state to adopt new policies that would incentivize
and promote retrofits. Regulation similar to Seattle's Energy Disclosure Requirement, which
mandates that owners of commercial and large multi-unit residential buildings disclose how much
energy their properties use, could highlight the benefits of energy efficiency and subsequently
contribute to retrofit market growth. ECC could work with Oakland and other California cities
to lobby for state legislation changes to remove barriers inhibiting large-scale retrofitting. The
growth and success of energy retrofit loan programs depends on creating finance mechanisms
that enable program expansion and the ease with which they deliver services. New and amended
legislation at the municipal and state levels could advance retrofit activity.
Fourth ECC can seek additional private investment to grow WERLR Even if Oakland upgrades
WERLP into a program built on equitable workforce development, positive economic gains, and
improved home energy efficiency for program participants, WERLP will still require additional
RLF capital to increase program scale. In its work, ECC looks to identify institutional investors to
finance retrofits. All Emerald Cities will benefit from this work, and as funding sources surface,
ECC supported retrofit programs will certainly grow.
conclusion
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a snapshot of the effects of ARRA's impact on local job
creation as the federal government continues to disburse Stimulus funds to states and cities. It
focuses on the energy efficiency sector and examines how Oakland, California uses grant dollars
from the Recovery Act to actuate an energy efficiency home retrofit program. The program,
WERLP, offers energy retrofit loans to low- and middle-income Oakland homeowners.
Oakland was selected as the primary study site because of its unique history of federal
investment and the persistent problems that have plagued the City for decades. In the 1940s
and again in the mid-1960s, Oakland experienced significant periods of federally-sponsored
economic development. The first period was during World War II, where President Roosevelt's
administration dedicated billions of public dollars to finance the wartime industries and the
migration of thousands of unemployed Americans to western coastal cities to fill jobs. This
brought new minority populations to the cities along the eastern shores of the San Francisco
Bay, the location of numerous industrial shipyards that produced many of the naval vessels
active in the Pacific war theater. The redlining housing policies, which began towards the end
of the war and continued into the subsequent peacetime period, essentially ghettoized minority
populations in Oakland and other East Bay cities. These policies contributed to economic and
geographic minority isolation in Oakland. By the 1960s, President Johnson's Great Society
programs financed the city Rebuilding Program intended to stem poverty, economic decline,
and racial unrest in the nation's declining inner city neighborhoods. The Economic Development
Administration, the government agency in charge of the Rebuilding Program, decided on Oakland
as the test pilot city. Over a five-year period the program failed to produce any meaningful
positive change in Oakland, was discontinued, and left the City in much the same position as
when the EDA initiated the pilot. After 40 years many of these problems still trouble the City.
Oakland currently struggles with high unemployment (18%, twice the national average), deep
poverty (42% of residents live at 200% of the federal poverty level or below), growing income
disparity and disinvestment. The pervasiveness of these problems has certainly set the stage
for extreme dissatisfaction among city residents and could be an incubator for social unrest.
This also places equitable development that targets disadvantaged minority populations at the
foreground of future investment in Oakland.
Last year, President Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act into law with
hopes of resuscitating the struggling national economy. An innovative aspect of the legislation
was its promotion of a new green economy that would foster job growth and environmental
improvement. The Stimulus awarded $23.5 billion to state and municipal energy efficiency
projects. Thus far, Oakland has received $77 million in Recovery Act funds for energy efficiency
and workforce development programs, and the City set aside $2 million to seed WERLP. It is
important to emphasize that city officials see the program as the first step in developing larger
and longer-term retrofit workforce and service sectors.
This thesis analyzes WERLP's structure and evaluates the program's potential for success. The
study compares Oakland's retrofit program design with similar strategies recently instated in
Portland, Oregon and Seattle, Washington. The comparative case study analysis points out that
Oakland's program stems from good intentions and satisfactory - but not excellent - planning.
Yet, considering its current structure WERLP can neither achieve the workforce or economic
development goals the federal government would like to see generated through such programs,
nor significantly impact greenhouse gas emissions in the City. By implementing more successful
program elements and legislation culled from Portland's Community Workforce Agreement and
Seattle's Energy Disclosure Requirement, Oakland can bolster WERLP's capacity for success.
Still, one issue that each of the programs analyzed herein must address is the need for additional
capital. In order to grow to levels of scale that will generate more impactful job numbers, boost
service delivery, and utilize energy retrofits to seriously contribute to environmental improvement,
the program will require additional capital possibly from public and private sources. Considering
California's fiscal crisis, which is another challenge that will tighten state financial coffers,
program officials should first target private funding sources. Despite the challenges Oakland
faces regarding how WERLP can be improved, the City should not waste this opportunity to
strengthen a program with so much potential.
The City of Oakland possesses a number of intelligent and able partners that can help it improve
WERLP. Numerous community, non-profit, and labor organizations as well as local businesses
exist within the City and surrounding area. These institutions can provide the logistical and
operational capacity that the City lacks - necessary capacity if the city is to refine and expand
WERLP. Incentives abound for many of these institutions to support the City in a campaign to
broaden the home energy retrofit market. Community organizations and non-profits maintain
close ties with City neighborhoods and particular constituencies that could most benefit from a
revised WERLP. Additionally, labor organizations like the Alameda Building Trades continue to
post high unemployment numbers due to the construction slowdown resulting from the national
financial crisis. Businesses that supply retrofit materials would also benefit from an energy
efficiency market expansion.
Like a number of cities that exhibited the vision to use ARRA funds to establish energy retrofit
programs, Oakland currently lacks the required capacity to develop a sophisticated retrofit
strategy designed to grow. The City should not be faulted for its efforts. In the midst of the
Stimulus frenzy, several municipalities, including Oakland, have worked aggressively to secure
competitive federal Stimulus grants and initiate new programs with the money. Still, these funding
blessings come with a strict timetable and use restrictions that make managing the process a
complex challenge outside of a city's traditional workflow. In this way the Stimulus is both a
boon and a burden in which cities like Oakland must maximize the opportunities presented by
the Recovery Act and adhere to its accompanying restrictions at the same time. Cities are under
a federal microscope like never before.
A new non-profit institution, the Emerald Cities Collaborative, could provide cities like Oakland
with a different level of capacity that will also facilitate retrofit program growth. Because
ECC represents the interests of unions, labor groups, community organizations, social justice
advocates, development intermediaries, research and technical assistance providers, socially
responsible businesses, and elected officials, the coalition is well positioned to assist cities in
brokering partnerships between local contractors, disadvantaged populations, and environmental
groups. The Coalition can mediate the development of a Community Workforce Agreement in
Oakland and advise the City on policies that would encourage retrofitting. Finally, ECC can work
with community development financial institutions to improve how WERLP manages its revolving
loan fund and potential investors to attract supplemental capital for the program. As a young
organization, ECC first, must address its own issue of limited capacity in order to provide cities
with productive support, and second, needs to rely on the vast expertise of its members. Initially,
the organization will need to focus its efforts in a handful of pilot cities to refine its practice before
extending services to other geographic areas.
Oakland has established a good framework for providing retrofit services through WERLP, but
the City needs to take further steps in order to maximize the opportunities created by its own
Climate Action Plan, the President's vision for ARRA, and the jarring statistics that highlight
the need for a new economic development strategy the prioritizes the City's least advantaged.
History reveals that federal investment in two respective economic development strategies failed
to produce positive and lasting change in Oakland. However, the Recovery Act is different
from previous experiments of government-sponsored development in the City because it grants
Oakland the opportunity to initiate a range of projects stimulating local economic growth. The
energy efficiency retrofit market is a budding industry with great potential, but cities, partner
organizations, and local businesses will have to work together to unlock the promise of the new
green economy.
appendix I
Limitations to this Study & Recommendations for Future Research
Due to limitations of time, resources, method, and research design, a number of unanswered
questions stem from this thesis. This research inquiry initially focused on Oakland's WERLP: how
it was developed, why it exhibits its particular design, and its implications for local workforce and
economic development. It soon became clear that, without other retrofit programs to compare
to WERLP, this thesis would struggle to elucidate best retrofit program practices and generalize
findings. This fact steered the research towards other cities implementing retrofit strategies, but
time constraints certainly limited the scope of analysis for all three cases.
The following four questions provide opportunities for future researchers to delve deeper into the
development, design, and outcomes of city-scale energy efficiency retrofit programs generated
via the Recovery Act. First, how do politics influence the process of establishing a city-scale
retrofit program? Cities interested in implementing city-scale retrofit programs would certainly
benefit from additional research outlining how Seattle, Portland, and Oakland's programs came
to be. What were the decisions that led to the development of the programs? Who were the
actors that pushed the ideas to the fore: city officials, labor, community, or business leaders? A
critical study of Portland's Community Workforce Agreement would greatly benefit organizations
interested in brokering similar contracts in their own cities. Eric Makres' M.I.T. Urban Planning
Master's thesis, Collaborative and Action-based Framing Processes for Social Movement Building,
analyzes how a similar process is unfolding in Boston, Massachusetts. His piece represents a
good starting place for information on the topic of collaborative planning.
Second, how do cities determine whether retrofit programs should target particular places
(a neighborhood or a city) or specific populations (low- to middle-income populations or
disadvantaged minority groups)? Seattle, Portland, and Oakland based their service delivery
targeting strategies on population criteria and do not (currently) focus efforts in designated
city areas. However in Kansas City, Missouri, the city has taken a place-based approach and
directed all Stimulus funds to one area of the City, appropriately named the Green Impact Zone.
Great value can be gleaned from research explaining why and when cities should pursue place-
or population- based retrofit strategies. M.I.T. Urban Planning Master's candidate, Leila Bozorg,
explores the implications of Kansas City's decision follow a place-based approach in Spatializing
Social Justice Through Place-Based Initiatives.
Third, how do we compare the application of Stimulus grants across different cities? A
frustrating aspect of this thesis was the inability to contextualize how Oakland's Stimulus awards
compare to other cities, and while the federal government demands strict accountability for
tracking funds, it also provides cities with different use options. Therefore it is difficult to compare
the total stimulus awards for multiple cities given the variability regarding how cities spend ARRA
grants and when they report information to federal government. In time the federal government
will release the data to make these comparisons, enabling researchers to examine which cities
realized the greatest gains in workforce and economic development and their contrasting levels
of efficiency.
Finally, how should we measure the success of the three retrofit programs analyzed herein?
The timing of this thesis precluded the possibility of evaluating the outcomes of the three retrofit
programs, but those outcomes will have critical implications for how urban planners design future
retrofit strategies. This thesis aimed to compare how three cities respectively designed energy
retrofit programs and distill the characteristics most likely to produce positive results. Still, as
these programs take hold, the retrofit field would gain from a summary of how Seattle, Portland,
and Oakland performed relative to the retrofit program criteria discussed in Chapter 2.
appendix II
Opinion-Editorial of Oakland's Stimulus Activity (written in response to a host of
articles recently published in the San Francisco Chronicle criticizing Oakland's
use of Recovery Act funds)
Over the past week, much has been made over California Inspector General Laura Chick's
report highlighting Oakland's misuse of stimulus funds, and in particular, Mayor Dellums' callous
response. It is critical that we hold our public officials accountable, but in this case we should
be judging Mayor Dellums more for his poor tact in acknowledging the problem and less for his
administration's ability to procure and actuate stimulus funds.
Americans have placed great optimism in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, but
such optimism should not overshadow the fact that the legislation has its problems. For many
cities, the Stimulus is both a blessing and a curse. It provides them with the opportunity to offer
a cadre of services to citizens that would have otherwise been impossible without the funds, but
it forces cities to spend Stimulus awards within a three-year period. While government oversight
is a good thing, for cities lacking internal capacity it presents another layer of complexity, which
can hinder the activation of ARRA dollars. For this reason it is important to look to history for
perspective.
There is a history of misusing federal government dollars in Oakland, but it begins in the 1960s
when the federal Economic Development Administration (EDA) used Oakland as the pilot city
for its Rebuilding Program. The program was a product of President Lyndon Johnson's Great
Society, and aimed to stimulate job growth in the nation's declining inner cities. In that effort the
EDA inefficiently spent $23 million ($130.5 million in today's dollars when adjusted for inflation)
and failed to generate less than half of the 3,000 local jobs the program projected. Historians
highlight the difficulty of holding contracting firms and agencies responsible for their actions
when huge amounts of government monies are involved as the root cause of the EDA failure.
So while Oakland's recent Stimulus transgression is certainly inexcusable, it should be noted
that the City is performing markedly better than the EDA did in the 1960s with a much larger
pool of money. The Inspector General's report explains that Oakland misspent $830,000 and
Mayor Dellums quickly responded (and the Inspector General affirmed) that the City is working
aggressively to fix these problems. Let's pray it does. Oakland's stimulus website claims that
it has been awarded $77 million through the Recovery Act for workforce development, training,
and energy efficiency. I hope that years down the line the evidence will show that, whether
Mayor Dellums was at the helm or not, Oakland truly capitalized on this recovery opportunity.
With a 17% unemployment rate and an 18% poverty rate, far too much is on the line.
It is much easier to criticize a public official than it is to address the systemic problems posed
by activating massive amounts of federal funding at the local level. We saw a similar set of
circumstances in the 1960s, but the present situation suggests that with appropriate oversight
and technical assistance, cities do not face an insurmountable problem. We would be better
served by exploring ways to affect changes when these issues occur rather than scapegoat a
mayor.
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